# 1NC

#### Short shutdown now- extension causes quick market collapse

**Reinhart et al 10-1**-13 [Vincent Reinhart, chief US economist, Morgan Stanley, Harm Bandholz, chief US economist, UniCredit, Aroop Chatterjee, FX strategist, Barclays, Vincent Chaigneau, rates strategist, Société Générale, Daniel Tenengauzer, US economist, Standard Chartered, Allan von Mehren, chief analyst at Danske, Trevor Greetham, director of asset allocation, Fidelity, “US shutdown reaction: ‘Odds favour a short event’,” <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/5bda1eb2-2a67-11e3-ade3-00144feab7de.html#axzz2gYttdnTn>]

The US government began shutting down a range of services on Tuesday after the Republican-controlled House of Representatives and the Democratic Senate failed to agree a short-term budget extension. The lack of an agreement by US politicians will lead to about 800,000 federal employees being placed on unpaid leave, a process known as furloughing. The following is a round-up of strategist and economist reaction:¶ Vincent Reinhart, chief US economist, Morgan Stanley:¶ The heat will build on politicians from constituents who were furloughed, inconvenienced, or fearful of market consequences. That is why we believe the odds favour a short event – over in one week.¶ Harm Bandholz, chief US economist, UniCredit:¶ I think it is only a matter of days, maybe hours, until the majority of Republicans will eventually free themselves from the pressure of the Tea Party minority and vote along with Congressional Democrats to reopen the government. But don’t forget, the government shutdown is merely the prelude to a much bigger issue, namely the forthcoming debt limit fight.¶ Aroop Chatterjee, FX strategist, Barclays:¶ In and of itself, the government shutdown appears to be a limited market event. The indirect effect, however, is on the other main risk scenario for markets – the deal on the debt ceiling. For example, a government shutdown could lead to a sharp increase in the public disapproval of Congress’s handling of fiscal matters and allow for a smoother agreement on the debt ceiling issue. Or on the flip side, it could embolden both sides to become more entrenched in their positions.¶ Vincent Chaigneau, rates strategist, Société Générale:¶ Keep calm and carry on. So it seems that is the message from the markets just now. The US government is going into partial shutdown for the first time in 17 years. This will hurt the economy, though not much if it’s short. Negotiations may keep us on tenterhooks for a couple more weeks, as we approach the debt ceiling. But there has been no sign of financial stress overnight.¶ Daniel Tenengauzer, US economist, Standard Chartered:¶ A shutdown lasting a few days would shave only a few decimal points off fourth-quarter economic growth. The hit to growth would come mainly from the impact of the furloughs on consumption – a similar event to the summer and the sequester-related furloughs of federal employees – and a potential hit to business confidence. The main risk to this expectation is that the shutdown continues for longer, potentially until or beyond the October 17 debt ceiling deadline.¶ Allan von Mehren, chief analyst at Danske:¶ The next FOMC [the monetary policy-setting Federal Open Market Committee] meeting is on 29-30 October. It is now more unlikely that tapering will start at this meeting as the Fed will probably wait to see the consequences of the increased uncertainty and effects of the shutdown. This strengthens our call that Fed tapering won’t start until December. If the shutdown drags out and has more negative effects on the economy the risk is tapering could start even later.¶ Given the increased uncertainty it also raises the odds of a further correction in stock markets. The reaction so far has been fairly muted. But given that markets have been technically overbought we think it’s likely we will see further declines in coming weeks. This should also add to downside pressure on bond yields. In the short term the risk is also that the dollar could weaken further.¶ Trevor Greetham, director of asset allocation, Fidelity:¶ We do not expect the fiscal stand-off in Washington to have a lasting impact and stock market weakness presents a buying opportunity.¶ The dispute has the power to depress economic activity temporarily and it will play havoc with the economic release calendar. But the US is four years into a steady, self-sustaining recovery and the Federal Reserve stands ready to offset any marginal fiscal tightening that may come out of the negotiations.

#### GOP hates the drone court – the plan would cost political capital

The Washington Times 2/13/13 (Cheryl K. Chumley, "Senate Republicans Shoot Down New Court to Oversee Drone Strikes")

Senate Republicans shot down a Democrat-inspired plan to create a new court to oversee the use of drones for attacks, saying the idea intrudes on executive powers.¶ “I think it’s a terrible idea,” said [Sen. Lindsey Graham](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/lindsey-graham/), in a report from The Hill. [The court](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/un-court/) would be “the biggest intrusion … in the history of the country” on the president’s role as commander in chief of the military.¶ The idea of creating a new court was brought forth last week by [Sen. Diane Feinstein](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/diane-feinstein/), The Hill reported.¶ [Sen. John McCain](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/john-mccain/)’s argued against [Ms. Feinstein](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/diane-feinstein/)’s plan, too, suggesting instead the drone program be moved into military hands to oversee.¶ “You just need to move it to the Department of Defense,” he said, in The Hill report. “We are talking about using equipment to kill people.”

#### \*\*\*Capital is key to get a deal

CNN 10/1/13 (Interview with Rick Lazio, Former US Congressman, Transcript: Anderson Cooper 360 Degrees, "Government Shutdown; Views of Obamacare Shaped by Misinformation; Is Losing Good for Kids?"

LAZIO: Getting back to the earlier point about entitlements and out- year spending, here's -- Democrats will criticize Republicans on obsessing on Obamacare. Republicans will say why doesn't the president lead on the most pressing fiscal issue that faces the country over the next 20 or 30 years?  You have got an explosion of seniors, 10,000 seniors retiring every single day in America. The program Social Security was created, signed by FDR into law, average life expectancy was 64 years old, eligibility 65, pretty good deal. But now...  BLOW: But, Rick, you're pretending that they never tried to do that.   Last time we got close to the debt ceiling, they got very close to a global deal, and it fell apart at the last minute. It's not as if the president has never gone to Boehner and tried to figure out how to do this.   LAZIO: But the president has to provide cover for moderate Democrats who want to get a deal done. And that's what he's failed to do. He's got to engage.   He's got to lead. And he's got to address some of these big picture issues. That's when you get a win-win out of this thing. If you could get both sides to come together and say we're going to really try and solve at least part of this entitlement picture, we will create some momentum, some trust, and that's a way forward.   (CROSSTALK)  BROWN: ... what exactly Obama right now is supposed to really do? When we talk about him engaging and him doing -- what actually is he supposed to do? Who's he supposed to call? How does it work at this moment in this particular situation?   LAZIO: I think you start to go and you speak to individual senators. He's done this with Bob Corker and other people where he's tried to court them and bring them in.  I think you have got to have some agenda, you have got to be somewhat flexible. You have got to say, OK, what do you think is doable? This is an area where obviously I have got limited flexibility, but let's get something significant done and I will help provide some air cover.

#### Economic collapse causes nuclear war

Merlini 11

[Cesare Merlini, nonresident senior fellow at the Center on the United States and Europe and chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Italian Institute for International Affairs (IAI) in Rome. He served as IAI president from 1979 to 2001. Until 2009, he also occupied the position of executive vice chairman of the Council for the United States and Italy, which he co-founded in 1983. His areas of expertise include transatlantic relations, European integration and nuclear non-proliferation, with particular focus on nuclear science and technology. A Post-Secular World? DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2011.571015 Article Requests: Order Reprints : Request Permissions Published in: journal Survival, Volume 53, Issue 2 April 2011 , pages 117 - 130 Publication Frequency: 6 issues per year Download PDF Download PDF (357 KB) View Related Articles To cite this Article: Merlini, Cesare 'A Post-Secular World?', Survival, 53:2, 117 – 130]

Two neatly opposed scenarios for the future of the world order illustrate the range of possibilities, albeit at the risk of oversimplification. The first scenario entails the premature crumbling of the post-Westphalian system. One or more of the acute tensions apparent today evolves into an open and traditional conflict between states, perhaps even involving the use of nuclear weapons. The crisis might be triggered by a collapse of the global economic and financial system, the vulnerability of which we have just experienced, and the prospect of a second Great Depression, with consequences for peace and democracy similar to those of the first. Whatever the trigger, the unlimited exercise of national sovereignty, exclusive self-interest and rejection of outside interference would likely be amplified, emptying, perhaps entirely, the half-full glass of multilateralism, including the UN and the European Union. Many of the more likely conflicts, such as between Israel and Iran or India and Pakistan, have potential religious dimensions. Short of war, tensions such as those related to immigration might become unbearable. Familiar issues of creed and identity could be exacerbated. One way or another, the secular rational approach would be sidestepped by a return to theocratic absolutes, competing or converging with secular absolutes such as unbridled nationalism.

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#### Drone courts aren’t a restriction- the affirmative must prohibit the ability of the president to conduct drone strikes- they only provide oversight

Jean Schiedler-Brown 12, Attorney, Jean Schiedler-Brown & Associates, Appellant Brief of Randall Kinchloe v. States Dept of Health, Washington, The Court of Appeals of the State of Washington, Division 1, http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/Briefs/A01/686429%20Appellant%20Randall%20Kincheloe%27s.pdf

3. The ordinary definition of the term "restrictions" also does not include the reporting and monitoring or supervising terms and conditions that are included in the 2001 Stipulation.

Black's Law Dictionary, 'fifth edition,(1979) defines "restriction" as;

A limitation often imposed in a deed or lease respecting the use to which the property may be put. The term "restrict' is also cross referenced with the term "restrain." Restrain is defined as; To limit, confine, abridge, narrow down, restrict, obstruct, impede, hinder, stay, destroy. To prohibit from action; to put compulsion on; to restrict; to hold or press back. To keep in check; to hold back from acting, proceeding, or advancing, either by physical or moral force, or by interposing obstacle, to repress or suppress, to curb.

In contrast, the terms "supervise" and "supervisor" are defined as; To have general oversight over, to superintend or to inspect. See Supervisor. A surveyor or overseer. . . In a broad sense, one having authority over others, to superintend and direct. The term "supervisor" means an individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, layoff, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibility to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but required the use of independent judgment.

Comparing the above definitions, it is clear that the definition of "restriction" is very different from the definition of "supervision"-very few of the same words are used to explain or define the different terms. In his 2001 stipulation, Mr. Kincheloe essentially agreed to some supervision conditions, but he did not agree to restrict his license.

#### C. Prefer our interpretation

#### Ground – the neg should be able to say Drone Strikes, Cyber ops, troop invasion and indefinite detention good/bad – This is core negative topic ground – they get to link turn any disadvantage based on topical action

#### Limits – they justify any aff that does transparency or requires a process before implementing a particular war power – this allows them to apply any oversight mechanism in international and/or domestic law- explodes the topic

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#### US winning the war on terror- no WMD attacks

Oswald 5/30, Rachel Oswald, staff editor for the National Journal and the Global Security Newswire, “Despite WMD fears, terrorists are focused on conventional attacks,” May 30, 2013, <http://www.nationaljournal.com/nationalsecurity/despite-wmd-fears-terrorists-are-focused-on-conventional-attacks-20130417?page=1&utm_source=feedly>

WASHINGTON – The United States has spent billions of dollars to prevent terrorists from obtaining a weapon of mass destruction even as this week’s [bombings in Boston](http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/police-scrutinize-remnants-boston-blasts/) further show that a nuclear weapon or lethal bioagent is not necessary for causing significant harm.¶ Organized group plots against the U.S. homeland since Sept. 11, 2001 have all involved conventional means of attack. Beyond that have been a handful of instances in which individuals used the postal system to deliver disease materials -- notably [this week’s ricin letters](http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/lab-confirms-ricin-letter-sent-senator/) to President Obama and at least one senator and the 2001 anthrax mailings.¶ Terrorism experts offer a range of reasons for why al-Qaida or other violent militants have never met their goal of carrying out a biological, chemical, nuclear or radiological attack on the United States or another nation. These include:¶ -- substantive efforts by the United States and partner nations to secure the most lethal WMD materials;¶ -- improved border security and visa checks that deny entry to possible foreign-born terrorists;¶ -- a lack of imagination and drive on the part of would-be terrorists to pursue the kind of novel but technically difficult attacks that could lead to widespread dispersal of unconventional materials;¶ -- a general haplessness on the part of the native-born U.S. extremists who have pursued WMD attacks, specifically involving weaponized pathogens;¶ -- elimination of most of al-Qaida’s original leadership, notably those members with the most experience orchestrating large-scale attacks abroad; and¶ -- the Arab Spring uprisings have likely drawn down the pool of terrorists with the proper training and focus to organize WMD attacks abroad as they have opted instead to join movements to overthrow governments in places such as Syria and Yemen.¶ “We killed a lot of people. That was one thing,” said Randall Larsen, founding director of the Bipartisan WMD Terrorism Research Center, referring to the deaths in recent years of al-Qaida chief Osama bin Laden and any number of his direct or philosophical adherents.¶ Bin Laden is known to have exhorted his followers to seek weapons of mass destruction for use in attacks against the West. Leading al-Qaida propagandist Anwar al-Awlaki of the group’s Yemen affiliate, who was killed in a 2011 U.S. drone strike, used his Inspire magazine to [encourage sympathizers](http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/al-qaeda-magazine-urges-chemical-biological-strikes-us/) to develop and carry out their own chemical and biological attacks.¶ Al-Qaida also had separate efforts in [Afghanistan](http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/al-qaeda-operatives-discussed-wmd-attacks-while-training-prior-to-911-report-says/) and [Malaysia](http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/us-officials-worried-by-release-of-al-qaeda-bioweapons-operative/) that worked on developing anthrax for use in attacks before they were broken up or abandoned following the September 2001 attacks.¶ In the last decade, the technological means to carry out new kinds of improvised WMD attacks such as those involving [laboratory-engineered pathogens](http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/synthetic-pathogens-might-pose-bioterror-threat-scientists-warn/) has become much more available. However, it can take some time for bad actors to recognize how these new technologies can open the doorway to heretofore unseen massively disruptive terrorist attacks, according to Larsen.¶ Passenger airplanes were flying across the United States for decades before any terrorists realized that they would make a highly destructive improvised weapon when flown at high speeds into skyscrapers filled with thousands of people, Larsen noted.¶ A 2012 analysis by terrorism experts at the New America Foundation detailed a number of disrupted unconventional weapon plots against the country that counterintuitively were much more likely to involve home-grown antigovernment groups and lone-wolf actors than Muslim extremists. "In the past decade, there is no evidence that jihadist extremists in the United States have acquired or attempted to acquire material to construct CBRN weapons," according to authors Peter Bergen and Jennifer Rowland.¶ They documented a [number of failed domestic plots](http://homegrown.newamerica.net/), often involving cyanide or ricin. Only former Army microbiologist Bruce Ivins was successful in actually carrying out such an effort, killing five people with anthrax spores in 2001.¶ “Right-wing and left-wing extremist groups and individuals have been far more likely to acquire toxins and to assemble the makings of radiological weapons than al-Qaida sympathizers,” they said.

#### Drone court crushes counter-terror- delay

Oliphant, 13 -- National Journal deputy magazine editor; citing Gregory McNeal, a counterterrorism expert at Pepperdine University

[James, “Vetting the Kill List,” 5-30-13, http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/vetting-the-kill-list-20130404, accessed 8-16-13, mss]

But even among supporters, no consensus exists on what questions a drone court would actually review or even whether its scrutiny would come before or after a strike. The most problematic scenario involves any sort of preoperational clearance. Possible windows for action open and shut in a matter of hours. The kill lists are constantly being revised and updated. Even many of those who argue for some sort of oversight mechanism, such as University of Texas law professor Robert Chesney, don’t believe a judge should be involved when it comes to “pulling the trigger.” Still, Chesney says such a court could still vet the names on the list in advance to ensure the administration is following its own guidelines for a strike: the target is connected to al-Qaida; he poses some threat of “imminent” harm; and the government is operating within its legal authority. “Whether and when to fire is a totally separate question,” Chesney says. (He notes that there’s a range of disagreement over how the administration classifies an “imminent” threat and whether a judge would be qualified to make that determination.) But even that small degree of oversight, warns Gregory McNeal, a counterterrorism expert at Pepperdine University, risks **throwing sand in the gears** by extending the timeline of an op. And to McNeal, this point leads directly to the larger issue of accountability—or, to use the Washington synonym, blame. Judges, he says, simply aren’t ever going to be equipped to identify and navigate the variables involved in a drone strike. Jeh Johnson, formerly the Obama administration’s top lawyer at the Pentagon, expressed his discomfort with court-based oversight in a speech last month at Fordham University. Questions of feasibility and imminence, he said, “are up-to-the-minute, real-time assessments.” More important, Johnson emphasized, “we want military and national security officials to continually assess and reassess these two questions up until the last minute of the operation.”

#### Drones key- disruption, decapitation, and destroys safe havens, specialists, and training

Byman, 13 -- Georgetown University Security Studies professor

[Daniel, Brookings Institution Saban Center for Middle East Policy Senior Fellow, "Why Drones Work," Foreign Affairs, July/August 2013, http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2013/06/17-drones-obama-weapon-choice-us-counterterrorism-byman, accessed 8-28-13, mss]

Despite President Barack Obama’s recent call to reduce the United States’ reliance on drones, they will likely remain his administration’s weapon of choice. Whereas President George W. Bush oversaw fewer than 50 drone strikes during his tenure, Obama has signed off on over 400 of them in the last four years, making the program the centerpiece of U.S. counterterrorism strategy. The drones have done their job remarkably well: by killing key leaders and denying terrorists sanctuaries in Pakistan, Yemen, and, to a lesser degree, Somalia, drones have devastated al Qaeda and associated anti-American militant groups. And they have done so at little financial cost, at no risk to U.S. forces, and with fewer civilian casualties than many alternative methods would have caused. Critics, however, remain skeptical. They claim that drones kill thousands of innocent civilians, alienate allied governments, anger foreign publics, illegally target Americans, and set a dangerous precedent that irresponsible governments will abuse. Some of these criticisms are valid; others, less so. In the end, drone strikes remain a necessary instrument of counterterrorism. The United States simply cannot tolerate terrorist safe havens in remote parts of Pakistan and elsewhere, and drones offer a comparatively low-risk way of targeting these areas while minimizing collateral damage. So drone warfare is here to stay, and it is likely to expand in the years to come as other countries’ capabilities catch up with those of the United States. But Washington must continue to improve its drone policy, spelling out clearer rules for extrajudicial and extraterritorial killings so that tyrannical regimes will have a harder time pointing to the U.S. drone program to justify attacks against political opponents. At the same time, even as it solidifies the drone program, Washington must remain mindful of the built-in limits of low-cost, unmanned interventions, since the very convenience of drone warfare risks dragging the United States into conflicts it could otherwise avoid. NOBODY DOES IT BETTER The Obama administration relies on drones for one simple reason: they work. According to data compiled by the New America Foundation, since Obama has been in the White House, U.S. drones have killed an estimated 3,300 al Qaeda, Taliban, and other jihadist operatives in Pakistan and Yemen. That number includes over 50 senior leaders of al Qaeda and the Taliban -- top figures who are not easily replaced. In 2010, Osama bin Laden warned his chief aide, Atiyah Abd al-Rahman, who was later killed by a drone strike in the Waziristan region of Pakistan in 2011, that when experienced leaders are eliminated, the result is “the rise of lower leaders who are not as experienced as the former leaders” and who are prone to errors and miscalculations. And drones also hurt terrorist organizations when they eliminate operatives who are lower down on the food chain but who boast special skills: passport forgers, bomb makers, recruiters, and fundraisers. Drones have also undercut terrorists’ ability to communicate and to train new recruits. In order to avoid attracting drones, al Qaeda and Taliban operatives try to avoid using electronic devices or gathering in large numbers. A tip sheet found among jihadists in Mali advised militants to “maintain complete silence of all wireless contacts” and “avoid gathering in open areas.” Leaders, however, cannot give orders when they are incommunicado, and training on a large scale is nearly impossible when a drone strike could wipe out an entire group of new recruits. Drones have turned al Qaeda’s command and training structures into a liability, forcing the group to choose between having no leaders and risking dead leaders.

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**The President of the United States should issue an executive order transferring lead executive authority for non-battlefield targeted killing from the Central Intelligence Agency to the Joint Special Operations Command. The President of the United States should disclose the results of all future targeted strikes to Congress.**

**Transferring authority boosts transparency and intel without restricting strikes – solves the aff**

**Zenko 13**¸ Micah, Douglas Dillon fellow with the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations, “Clip the Agency's Wings: Why Obama needs to take the drones away from the CIA,” April 16th, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/04/16/clip\_the\_agencys\_wings\_cia\_drones?utm\_source=feedly

Last month, Daniel Klaidman reported that three senior officials had told him that President Obama would gradually transfer targeted killings to the Pentagon during his second term. Other journalists report that this is not a certainty or that "it would most likely leave drone operations in Pakistan under the CIA," making any transition meaningless since over 80 percent of all U.S. targeted killings have occurred in Pakistan. But if Obama is serious about reforming targeted killing policies, as he has stated, then he needs to sign an executive order transferring lead executive authority for non-battlefield targeted killings from the CIA to the Defense Department. Doing this has three significant benefits for U.S. foreign policy. First, it would increase the transparency of targeted killings, including what methods are used to prevent civilian harm. Strikes by the CIA are classified as Title 50 "covert action," which under law are "activities of the United States Government...where it is intended that the role of the United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly, but does not include traditional...military activities." CIA operations purportedly allow for deniability about the U.S. role, though this rationale no longer applies to the highly-publicized drone campaign in Pakistan, which Obama personally acknowledged in January 2012. Beyond adjectives in public speeches ("methodical," "deliberate," "not willy-nilly"), the government does not, and cannot, describe the procedures and rules for CIA targeted killings. JSOC operations in Somalia and Yemen, on the other hand, fall under the Title 10 "armed forces" section of U.S. law, which the White House reports as "direct action" to Congress. The United States has also acknowledged clandestine military operations to the United Nations "against al-Qaida terrorist targets in Somalia in response to on-going threats to the United States." Moreover, JSOC operations are guided by military doctrine, available to the public in Joint Publication 3-60 (JP 3-60): Joint Targeting. (While the complete 2007 edition can be found online, only the executive summary of the most-recent version, released on January 31, is available. If the Joint Staff's J-7 Directorate for Joint Force Development posted this updated edition in its entirety -- or fulfilled my FOIA request [case number 13-F-0514] -- that would be appreciated.) JP 3-60 matters because it details each step in the targeting cycle, including the fundamentals, processes, responsibilities, legal considerations, and methods to reduce civilian casualties. This degree of transparency is impossible for CIA covert actions. Second, it would focus the finite resources and bandwidth of the CIA on its primary responsibilities of intelligence collection, analysis, and early warning. Last year, the President's Intelligence Advisory Board -- a semi-independent executive branch body, the findings of which rarely leak -- reportedly told Obama that "U.S. spy agencies were paying inadequate attention to China, the Middle East and other national security flash points because they had become too focused on military operations and drone strikes." This is not a new charge, since every few years an independent group or congressional report determines that "the CIA has been ignoring its core mission activities." But, as Mark Mazzetti shows in his indispensable CIA history, the agency has evolved from an organization once deeply divided at senior levels about using armed drones, to one that is a fully functioning paramilitary army. As former senior CIA official Ross Newland warns, the agency's armed drones program "ends up hurting the CIA. This just is not an intelligence mission." There is no longer any justification for the CIA to have its own redundant fleet of 30 to 35 armed drones. During White House debates of CIA requests in 2009, Gen. James Cartwright, the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, repeatedly asked: "Can you tell me why we are building a second Air Force?" Obama eventually granted every single request made by then-Director of Central Intelligence Leon Panetta, adding: "The CIA gets what it wants." With this year's proposed National Intelligence Program budget scheduled to fall by 8 percent, an open checkbook for Langley is not sustainable or strategically wise.

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#### US-Saudi relations are high now – counter terrorism cooperation is critical to the alliance

Riedel 8/21/13 (Bruce, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Brookings Institution, "US and Saudis Share Needs If Not Values")

America's alliance with Saudi Arabia began with F.D.R. in 1945, and for almost 70 years the kingdom has been our most reliable ally in the Muslim world. It has fought the Soviets, Saddam, Khomeini and Bin Laden with us while providing critical backing to the Arab-Israeli peace process.¶ With its vast oil resources and command of Mecca, the House of Saud is a formidable ally. But the alliance has always been based on shared threat assessments, not shared values. The King is the world's last absolute monarchy. There is no pretense of democracy or pluralism in the Kingdom.¶ The Saudis have led the counter revolution to the Arab Awakening, occupying Bahrain, controlling change in Yemen and backing the army coup d'etat in Egypt with money and royal approval. The king personally has embraced General Sisi and the crackdown on the Brotherhood. Even in Syria, where Riyadh backs the rebels, they want a Sunni strong man to replace Assad not a democracy.¶ Washington and Riyadh still need each other. Many of our interests still over lap. Saudi assistance helps our allies like Jordan and Morocco.Saudi intelligence was key to foiling the last two al Qaeda plots to attack the American homeland and is critical to the battle in Yemen against the terrorists. Saudi Arabia is also central to keeping pressure on Iran through sanctions by replacing Iranian oil on the market.¶ America has much to lose and little to gain if the Arab revolutions spread to the kingdom itself. So we face the challenge of being the Saudis' ally while we disagree on core values.

#### The plan would crush US-Saudi relations – a hardline stance against AQAP is critical to Saudi legitimacy

Eakin 12 (Hugh, IRP Gatekeeper Editor, May 21 2012 The New York Review, "Saudi Arabia and the New US War in Yemen"

What seems clear is that Saudi Arabia has become a key backer—and at times coordinator—of the accelerating US drone war and special operations offensive in Yemen, partly for its own security interests. Interior Ministry officials in Riyadh speak enthusiastically about the US drone program, and on May 12, drone strikes allegedly killed some eleven AQAP suspects, [two of them Saudi nationals](http://www.voanews.com/content/drones_in_yemen_kill_11_militants/566327.html). (It is worth noting, following the controversial killing of US citizen Anwar al-Awlaki, that Saudi Arabia does not appear to have many qualms about killing its own citizens in Yemen.)¶ Perhaps most important for the Saudi government, a successful counterterrorism policy carries enormous political value amid the upheavals of the Arab Spring. Even more than democratization or regime change in the region, the Saudi rulers seem to fear instability and unpredictability: though they have reluctantly supported the transition of power in Yemen, they are particularly nervous about the kind of extremism that has emerged in neighboring countries like Iraq, Yemen, and now Syria, when uprisings turn into violent conflict or authority breaks down entirely—places where Saudi jihadists have often found new causes. “Syria will be tempting to al-Qaeda,” Abdulrahman Alhadaq, a Saudi counter terrorism official, said in a briefing in Riyadh. “We need to avoid another Iraq.”¶ But Saudi counterterrorism efforts are also an important element in achieving consensus and legitimacy for the Saudi regime itself. Many young Saudis are growing increasingly impatient with their government’s oppressive status quo, and not a little of their ire is directed against the Interior Ministry, which has been blamed for arbitrary arrests of activists and human rights lawyers. Yet many I spoke to also seem to fear the chaos and violence that has engulfed so many of the country’s neighbors. In the early 2000s, when the Saudi government sponsored national dialogues to bring together activists, reformers, conservatives, and Islamists from across the ideological spectrum to suggest avenues of change, the country’s counterterrorism approach was one issue on which there was near universal agreement. (Participants in one of these dialogues explicitly endorsed a strategy of repentence and reconciliation for extremists.)¶ Turning Saudi Arabia into the US’s indispensable ally in Yemen—while making Yemen the central conflict in the US-led war against terrorism—has considerable strategic value for Crown Prince Nayef, who was named the heir apparent to King Abdullah last fall. As US-Saudi collaboration on security and counterterrorism has increased, the regime has largely avoided US pressure on human rights and domestic reforms. And while it keeps the terror threat at bay, at least within its own borders, the Interior Ministry can hold up Yemen as the example of what might happen at home if its broad powers were curbed. Whether that argument will continue to assuage the country’s youth remains an open question.

#### That causes Saudi nuclearization

Rozen ‘11 [Laura, the chief foreign policy reporter for Politico, quoting Patrick Clawson, a Persian Gulf expert at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and Marc Lynch, a Middle East expert at George Washington University, Arab spring setbacks in the shadow of complicated U.S.-Saudi alliance, 4/18/11, <http://news.yahoo.com/s/yblog_theenvoy/20110418/ts_yblog_theenvoy/optimism-for-arab-spring-fades-in-face-of-complicated-u-s-saudi-alliance>]

**Riyadh, alarmed by** the **Obama** administration's failure to prop up its ally of three decades Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, **is sending signs of its displeasure and interest in exploring alternative security arrangements**. Last month, former Saudi envoy to Washington now Saudi national security chief Prince **Bandar** **went to Pakistan, ostensibly to discuss the possibility of recruiting Pakistani troops** to help Sunni Gulf allies suppress Bahraini unrest. But some Washington **Middle East analysts interpreted the visit as a signal of possible Saudi interest in exploring being protected by a Pakistani nuclear security umbrella, or acquiring Pakistani nuclear weapons, if Washington doesn't sufficiently assure Riyadh that it will protect it from a nuclear Iran**. "The big problem we face is that at the very least the **Saudis** and [United Arab Emirates] **wonder to what extent we are committed to their most vital interests**," said Patrick Clawson, a Persian Gulf expert at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. "Prince Bandar's visit to Pakistan is a shot across our bow of what the Saudis may feel is necessary if the U.S. is not providing an effective security guarantee.... The rumors in the region have long been that the Saudis paid a fair chunk of the bill" for Pakistan's nuclear program. "The momentum of the Arab revolutions has stalled, and the old Middle East is reasserting itself," said Marc Lynch, a Middle East expert at George Washington University who frequently consults with the Obama administration. In the current strategic malaise, Lynch said, "the Israelis and Palestinians are saying, 'what about us?' **The 'contain Iran' crowd is saying, 'don't forget about Iran.'" And the Saudis are playing up rising Sunni-Shiite tensions in the region, which "gives them an excuse," he added, to push their contain-Iran agenda, as well as to "equate Iranian subversion for use against their own Shia population**. Any time Saudi Shia make demands for political rights, they are accused of being Iranian agents."

#### Causes nuclear war and turns terrorism

Edelman ‘11 [Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. Former Undersecretary for Defense—AND—Andrew Krepinevich—President of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments—AND—Evan Montgomery—Research Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (Eric, The dangers of a nuclear Iran, FA 90;1, <http://www.csbaonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/2010.12.27-The-Dangers-of-a-Nuclear-Iran.pdf>]

There is, however, at least one state that could receive significant outside support: Saudi Arabia. And if it did, proliferation could accelerate throughout the region. Iran and Saudi Arabia have long been geopolitical and ideological rivals. Riyadh would face tremendous pressure to respond in some form to a nuclear-armed Iran, not only to deter Iranian coercion and subversion but also to preserve its sense that Saudi Arabia is the leading nation in the Muslim world. The Saudi government is already pursuing a nuclear power capability, which could be the first step along a slow road to nuclear weapons development. And concerns persist that it might be able to accelerate its progress by exploiting its close ties to Pakistan. During the 1980s, in response to the use of missiles during the Iran-Iraq War and their growing proliferation throughout the region, Saudi Arabia acquired several dozen CSS-2 intermediate-range ballistic missiles from China. The Pakistani government reportedly brokered the deal, and it may have also offered to sell Saudi Arabia nuclear warheads for the CSS-2S, which are not accurate enough to deliver conventional warheads effectively. There are still rumors that Riyadh and Islamabad have had discussions involving nuclear weapons, nuclear technology, or security guarantees. This "Islamabad option" could develop in one of several different ways. Pakistan could sell operational nuclear weapons and delivery systems to Saudi Arabia, or it could provide the Saudis with the infrastructure, material, and technical support they need to produce nuclear weapons themselves within a matter of years, as opposed to a decade or longer. Not only has Pakistan provided such support in the past, but it is currently building two more heavy-water reactors for plutonium production and a second chemical reprocessing facility to extract plutonium from spent nuclear fuel. In other words, it might accumulate more fissile material than it needs to maintain even a substantially expanded arsenal of its own. Alternatively, Pakistan might offer an extended deterrent guarantee to Saudi Arabia and deploy nuclear weapons, delivery systems, and troops on Saudi territory, a practice that the United States has employed for decades with its allies. This arrangement could be particularly appealing to both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. It would allow the Saudis to argue that they are not violating the NPT since they would not be acquiring their own nuclear weapons. And an extended deterrent from Pakistan might be preferable to one from the United States because stationing foreign Muslim forces on Saudi territory would not trigger the kind of popular opposition that would accompany the deployment of U.S. troops. Pakistan, for its part, would gain financial benefits and international clout by deploying nuclear weapons in Saudi Arabia, as well as strategic depth against its chief rival, India. The Islamabad option raises a host of difficult issues, perhaps the most worrisome being how India would respond. Would it target Pakistan's weapons in Saudi Arabia with its own conventional or nuclear weapons? How would this expanded nuclear competition influence stability during a crisis in either the Middle East or South Asia? Regardless of India's reaction, any decision by the Saudi government to seek out nuclear weapons, by whatever means, would be highly destabilizing. It would increase the incentives of other nations in the Middle East to pursue nuclear weapons of their own. And it could increase their ability to do so by eroding the remaining barriers to nuclear proliferation: each additional state that acquires nuclear weapons weakens the nonproliferation regime, even if its particular method of acquisition only circumvents, rather than violates, the NPT. N-PLAYER COMPETITION Were Saudi Arabia to acquire nuclear weapons, the Middle East would count three nuclear-armed states, and perhaps more before long. It is unclear how such an n-player competition would unfold because most analyses of nuclear deterrence are based on the U.S.-Soviet rivalry during the Cold War. It seems likely, however, that the interaction among three or more nuclear-armed powers would be more prone to miscalculation and escalation than a bipolar competition. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union only needed to concern themselves with an attack from the other. Multi-polar systems are generally considered to be less stable than bipolar systems because coalitions can shift quickly, upsetting the balance of power and creating incentives for an attack. More important, emerging nuclear powers in the Middle East might not take the costly steps necessary to preserve regional stability and avoid a nuclear exchange. For nuclear-armed states, the bedrock of deterrence is the knowledge that each side has a secure second-strike capability, so that no state can launch an attack with the expectation that it can wipe out its opponents' forces and avoid a devastating retaliation. However, emerging nuclear powers might not invest in expensive but survivable capabilities such as hardened missile silos or submarine-based nuclear forces. Given this likely vulnerability, the close proximity of states in the Middle East, and the very short flight times of ballistic missiles in the region, any new nuclear powers might be compelled to "launch on warning" of an attack or even, during a crisis, to use their nuclear forces preemptively. Their governments might also delegate launch authority to lower-level commanders, heightening the possibility of miscalculation and escalation. Moreover, if early warning systems were not integrated into robust command-and-control systems, the risk of an unauthorized or accidental launch would increase further still. And without sophisticated early warning systems, a nuclear attack might be unattributable or attributed incorrectly. That is, assuming that the leadership of a targeted state survived a first strike, it might not be able to accurately determine which nation was responsible. And this uncertainty, when combined with the pressure to respond quickly, would create a significant risk that it would retaliate against the wrong party, potentially triggering a regional nuclear war. Most existing nuclear powers have taken steps to protect their nuclear weapons from unauthorized use: from closely screening key personnel to developing technical safety measures, such as permissive action links, which require special codes before the weapons can be armed. Yet there is no guarantee that emerging nuclear powers would be willing or able to implement these measures, creating a significant risk that their governments might lose control over the weapons or nuclear material and that nonstate actors could gain access to these items. Some states might seek to mitigate threats to their nuclear arsenals; for instance, they might hide their weapons. In that case, however, a single intelligence compromise could leave their weapons vulnerable to attack or theft.

# 1NC Solvency

#### Obama can circumvent the plan- covert loopholes are inevitable

**Lohmann 1-28**-13 [Julia, director of the Harvard Law National Security Research Committee, BA in political science from the University of California, Berkeley, “Distinguishing CIA-Led from Military-Led Targeted Killings,” <http://www.lawfareblog.com/wiki/the-lawfare-wiki-document-library/targeted-killing/effects-of-particular-tactic-on-issues-related-to-targeted-killings/>]

The U.S. military—in particular, the Special Operations Command (SOCOM), and its subsidiary entity, the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC)—is responsible for carrying out military-led targeted killings.¶ Military-led targeted killings are subject to various legal restrictions, including a complex web of statutes and executive orders. For example, because the Covert Action Statute does not distinguish among institutions undertaking covert actions, targeted killings conducted by the military that fall within the definition of “covert action” set forth in 50 U.S.C. § 413(b) are subject to the same statutory constraints as are CIA covert actions. 50 U.S.C. § 413b(e). However, as Robert Chesney explains, many military-led targeted killings may fall into one of the CAS exceptions—for instance, that for traditional military activities—so that the statute’s requirements will not always apply to military-led targetings. Such activities are exempted from the CAS’s presidential finding and authorization requirements, as well as its congressional reporting rules.¶ Because such unacknowledged military operations are, in many respects, indistinguishable from traditional covert actions conducted by the CIA, this exception may provide a “loophole” allowing the President to circumvent existing oversight mechanisms without substantively changing his operational decisions. However, at least some military-led targetings do not fall within the CAS exceptions, and are thus subject to that statute’s oversight requirements. For instance, Chesney and Kenneth Anderson explain, some believe that the traditional military activities exception to the CAS only applies in the context of overt hostilities, yet it is not clear that the world’s tacit awareness that targeted killing operations are conducted (albeit not officially acknowledged) by the U.S. military, such as the drone program in Pakistan, makes those operations sufficiently overt to place them within the traditional military activities exception, and thus outside the constraints of the CAS.¶ Chesney asserts, however, that despite the gaps in the CAS’s applicability to military-led targeted killings, those targetings are nevertheless subject to a web of oversight created by executive orders that, taken together, largely mirrors the presidential authorization requirements of the CAS. But, this process is not enshrined in statute or regulation and arguably could be changed or revoked by the President at any time. Moreover, this internal Executive Branch process does not involve Congress or the Judiciary in either ex ante or ex post oversight of military-led targeted killings, and thus, Philip Alston asserts, it may be insufficient to provide a meaningful check against arbitrary and overzealous Executive actions.

#### Plan can’t solve future president rollback

**Fournier 5-28**-13 [Ron Fournier is the Editorial Director of National Journal. Prior to joining National Journal, he worked at the Associated Press for 20 years, most recently as Washington Bureau Chief. Starting with a Little Rock posting, covering Bill Clinton's second term as governor, Fournier moved to Washington to report on the Clinton White House. He has won numerous awards for his work, including the Society of Professional Journalists' Sigma Delta Chi Award for coverage of the 2000 elections and a four-time winner of the prestigious White House Correspondents' Association Merriman Smith Memorial Award. His 2012 piece on the decline of U.S. institutions, "In Nothing We Trust," was awarded an honorable mention in David Brook’s essay contest, the Sidney Awards, “What If the Next President Is Even Worse?” <http://www.nationaljournal.com/politics/what-if-the-next-president-is-even-worse-20130528>]

George W. Bush in 2001 declared war on a tactic (terrorism), and empowered Big Brother to tap phones, launch drones, and indefinitely imprison people without due process.¶ Barack Obama in 2008 declared those Bush policies an overreach, and pledged to curb drone strikes, protect media freedoms, and close the prison at Guantanamo Bay. Instead, he escalated drone strikes and spied on the media. Gitmo is still open for its grim business.¶ These are facts. And yet, they are distorted by extreme and narrow-minded partisans, supporters of both Bush and Obama.¶ Conservatives contend that Bush single-handedly prevented a major terrorist strike after Sept. 11, 2001. They demagogue efforts to shift the pendulum back toward civil liberties. Last week, when Obama finally proposed a modest reassessment of the Bush doctrine, Sen. Saxby Chambliss, R-Ga., claimed the efforts "will be viewed by terrorists as a victory."¶ Liberals hypocritically gave Obama a pass for furthering the same policies they condemned in 2008. Criticism from the left was half-hearted and muted, compared with their Bush-era indignation. On Gitmo, left-wingers rightly blamed the GOP for blocking closure but didn't shame Obama into using his executive authority to shutter the pit.¶ Some progressives even tried to justify the Obama administration's efforts to criminalize the work of a Fox News reporter. Would they be so blase about a White House targeting MSNBC?¶ As Leonard Downie Jr. wrote in Sunday's Washington Post, "Hardly anything seems immune from constitutionally dangerous politicking in a polarized Washington."¶ But that's no excuse for missing the big picture, which is this: Bush and Obama shouldn't worry you nearly as much as the next president.¶ Or the one after that.¶ Think about it, liberals. What if there is a president in your lifetime who is more conservative than Bush? What if that commander in chief is empowered, as were Bush and Obama, by a national tragedy and a compliant Congress?¶ Your guy Obama has armed a president-turned-zealot with dangerous powers and precedents.¶ Think about it, conservatives. It may be maddening to listen to Obama tie himself into knots over the balance between liberty and freedom, but what if the next Democratic president sees no limit on a commander in chief's powers? What if he or she doesn't give a whit about offending the mainstream media? The IRS targeting conservatives is a scandal, but there is no evidence that it was directed by the White House. What if the next Democratic president publicly declared his or her political opponents a direct threat to national security, and openly deployed federal agents against them?¶ Before your eyes roll out of your heads, it is not unthinkable that a future president could make Bush and Obama look downright libertarian. We live in an age of rapid connectivity and hyper-celebrity, forces that create, destroy, and often resurrect public figures within the lifespan of a cicada. Does the name Justin Bieber ring a bell?¶ How about Sarah Palin? Our culture of celebrity coupled with the public's disaffection with Washington, could lead to the election of a true demagogue or reactionary. Put it this way: What if Huey Long had had access to the Internet? Or even Pat Buchanan? Don't be blinded by partisanship.

# 1NC Drone Prolif

#### Boston globe evidence doesn’t say drone court is modeled- just that it’s an example of oversight

#### Prolif is inevitable- no one models US restraint

**Etzioni ‘13** [Amitai, professor of international relations at George Washington University, “The Great Drone Debate,” March-April, <http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20130430_art004.pdf>]

Other critics contend that by the United States using drones, it leads other countries into making and using them. For example, Medea Benjamin, the cofounder of the anti-war activist group CODEPINK and author of a book about drones argues that, “The proliferation of drones should evoke reﬂection on the precedent that the United States is setting by killing anyone it wants, anywhere it wants, on the basis of secret information. Other nations and non-state entities are watching—and are bound to start acting in a similar fashion.”60 Indeed scores of countries are now manufacturing or purchasing drones. There can be little doubt that the fact that drones have served the United States well has helped to popularize them. However, it does not follow that United States should not have employed drones in the hope that such a show of restraint would deter others. First of all, this would have meant that either the United States would have had to allow terrorists in hardto-reach places, say North Waziristan, to either roam and rest freely—or it would have had to use bombs that would have caused much greater collateral damage. Further, the record shows that even when the United States did not develop a particular weapon, others did. Thus, China has taken the lead in the development of anti-ship missiles and seemingly cyber weapons as well. One must keep in mind that the international environment is a hostile one. Countries—and especially non-state actors— most of the time do not play by some set of selfconstraining rules. Rather, they tend to employ whatever weapons they can obtain that will further their interests. The United States correctly does not assume that it can rely on some non-existent implicit gentleman’s agreements that call for the avoidance of new military technology by nation X or terrorist group Y—if the United States refrains from employing that technology.

#### US legal modeling fails- can’t shape norms

**Law and Versteeg ’12** [David S. Law, Professor of Law and Professor of Political Science, Washington University in St. Louis. B.A., M.A., Ph.D., Stanford University; J.D., Harvard Law School; B.C.L. in European and Comparative Law, University of Oxford, Mila Versteeg, Associate Professor, University of Virginia School of Law. B.A., LL.M., Tilburg University; LL.M., Harvard Law School; D.Phil., University of Oxford, “The Declining Influence of the United States Constitution,” New York University Law Review, Vol. 87, No. 3, pp. 762-858, June 2012, online]

The appeal of American constitutionalism as a model for other countries appears to be waning in more ways than one. Scholarly¶ attention has thus far focused on global judicial practice: There is a¶ growing sense, backed by more than purely anecdotal observation,¶ that foreign courts cite the constitutional jurisprudence of the U.S.¶ Supreme Court less frequently than before.247 But the behavior of¶ those who draft and revise actual constitutions exhibits a similar pattern.¶ Our empirical analysis shows that the content of the U.S.¶ Constitution is becoming increasingly atypical by global standards.¶ Over the last three decades, other countries have become less likely to¶ model the rights-related provisions of their own constitutions upon¶ those found in the U.S. Constitution. Meanwhile, global adoption of key structural features of the Constitution, such as federalism, presidentialism, and a decentralized model of judicial review, is at best¶ stable and at worst declining. In sum, rather than leading the way for¶ global constitutionalism, the U.S. Constitution appears instead to be losing its appeal as a model for constitutional drafters elsewhere. The¶ idea of adopting a constitution may still trace its inspiration to the¶ United States, but the manner in which constitutions are written¶ increasingly does not.¶ If the U.S. Constitution is indeed losing popularity as a model for¶ other countries, what—or who—is to blame? At this point, one can¶ only speculate as to the actual causes of this decline, but five possible hypotheses suggest themselves: (1) the advent of a superior or more¶ attractive competitor; (2) a general decline in American hegemony;¶ (3) judicial parochialism; (4) constitutional obsolescence; and (5) a creed of American exceptionalism.¶ With respect to the first hypothesis, there is little indication that¶ the U.S. Constitution has been displaced by any specific competitor.¶ Instead, the notion that a particular constitution can serve as a dominant¶ model for other countries may itself be obsolete. There is an¶ increasingly clear and broad consensus on the types of rights that a¶ constitution should include, to the point that one can articulate the¶ content of a generic bill of rights with considerable precision.248 Yet it is difficult to pinpoint a specific constitution—or regional or international¶ human rights instrument—that is clearly the driving force¶ behind this emerging paradigm. We find only limited evidence that global constitutionalism is following the lead of either newer national¶ constitutions that are often cited as influential, such as those of¶ Canada and South Africa, or leading international and regional¶ human rights instruments such as the Universal Declaration of¶ Human Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights.¶ Although Canada in particular does appear to exercise a quantifiable¶ degree of constitutional influence or leadership, that influence is not¶ uniform and global, but more likely reflects the emergence and evolution¶ of a shared practice of constitutionalism among common law¶ countries.249 Our findings suggest, instead, that the development of¶ global constitutionalism is a polycentric and multipolar process that is¶ not dominated by any particular country.250 The result might be likened¶ to a global language of constitutional rights, but one that has¶ been collectively forged rather than modeled upon a specific¶ constitution.¶ Another possibility is that America’s capacity for constitutional¶ leadership is at least partly a function of American “soft power” more¶ generally.251 It is reasonable to suspect that the overall influence and appeal of the United States and its institutions have a powerful spillover¶ effect into the constitutional arena. The popularity of American¶ culture, the prestige of American universities, and the efficacy of¶ American diplomacy can all be expected to affect the appeal of¶ American constitutionalism, and vice versa. All are elements of an¶ overall American brand, and the strength of that brand helps to determine¶ the strength of each of its elements. Thus, any erosion of the¶ American brand may also diminish the appeal of the Constitution for¶ reasons that have little or nothing to do with the Constitution itself.¶ Likewise, a decline in American constitutional influence of the type¶ documented in this Article is potentially indicative of a broader decline in American soft power.¶ There are also factors specific to American constitutionalism that¶ may be reducing its appeal to foreign audiences. Critics suggest that¶ the Supreme Court has undermined the global appeal of its own jurisprudence¶ by failing to acknowledge the relevant intellectual contributions of foreign courts on questions of common concern252 and by¶ pursuing interpretive approaches that lack acceptance elsewhere.253¶ On this view, the Court may bear some responsibility for the declining¶ influence of not only its own jurisprudence, but also the actual U.S.¶ Constitution: One might argue that the Court’s approach to constitutional¶ issues has undermined the appeal of American constitutionalism¶ more generally, to the point that other countries have become¶ unwilling to look either to American constitutional jurisprudence or¶ to the U.S. Constitution itself for inspiration.254¶ It is equally plausible, however, that responsibility for the¶ declining appeal of American constitutionalism lies with the idiosyncrasies¶ of the Constitution itself rather than the proclivities of the¶ Supreme Court. As the oldest formal constitution still in force and one of the most rarely amended constitutions in the world,255 the U.S.¶ Constitution contains relatively few of the rights that have become¶ popular in recent decades.256 At the same time, some of the provisions¶ that it does contain may appear increasingly problematic, unnecessary,¶ or even undesirable with the benefit of two hundred years of¶ hindsight.257 It should therefore come as little surprise if the U.S.¶ Constitution strikes those in other countries—or, indeed, members of¶ the U.S. Supreme Court258—as out of date and out of line with global¶ practice.259 Moreover, even if the Court were committed to interpreting¶ the Constitution in tune with global approaches, it would still¶ lack the power to update the actual text of the document. Indeed,¶ efforts by the Court to update the Constitution via interpretation may¶ actually reduce the likelihood of formal amendment by rendering such¶ amendment unnecessary as a practical matter.260 As a result, there is¶ only so much that the U.S. Supreme Court can do to make the U.S.¶ Constitution an attractive formal template for other countries. The¶ obsolescence of the Constitution, in turn, may undermine the appeal¶ of American constitutional jurisprudence. Foreign courts have little¶ reason to follow the Supreme Court’s lead on constitutional issues if¶ the Supreme Court is saddled with the interpretation of an unusual¶ and obsolete constitution.261 No amount of ingenuity or solicitude for¶ foreign law on the part of the Court can entirely divert attention from¶ the fact that the Constitution itself is an increasingly atypical¶ document. One way to put a more positive spin on the U.S. Constitution’s¶ status as a global outlier is to emphasize its role in articulating and¶ defining what is unique about American national identity. Many¶ scholars have opined that formal constitutions serve an expressive¶ function as statements of national identity.262 This view finds little¶ support in our own empirical findings, which suggest instead that constitutions¶ tend to contain relatively standardized packages of rights.263¶ Nevertheless, to the extent that constitutions do serve such a function,¶ the distinctiveness of the U.S. Constitution may reflect the uniqueness¶ of America’s national identity. In this vein, various scholars have¶ argued that the U.S. Constitution lies at the very heart of an¶ “American creed of exceptionalism,” which combines a belief that the¶ United States occupies a unique position in the world with a commitment¶ to the qualities that set the United States apart from other countries.¶ 264 From this perspective, the Supreme Court’s reluctance to¶ make use of foreign and international law in constitutional cases¶ amounts not to parochialism, but rather to respect for the exceptional¶ character of the nation and its constitution.265¶ Unfortunately, it is clear that the reasons for the declining influence¶ of American constitutionalism cannot be reduced to anything as¶ simple or attractive as a longstanding American creed of exceptionalism.¶ Historically, American exceptionalism has not prevented other¶ countries from following the example set by American constitutionalism.¶ The global turn away from the American model is a relatively recent development that postdates the Cold War. If the U.S.¶ Constitution does in fact capture something profoundly unique about¶ the United States, it has surely been doing so for longer than the last¶ thirty years.¶ A complete explanation of the declining influence of American¶ constitutionalism in other countries must instead be sought in more¶ recent history, such as the wave of constitution making that followed¶ the end of the Cold War.266 During this period, America’s newfound¶ position as lone superpower might have been expected to create¶ opportunities for the spread of American constitutionalism. But this¶ did not come to pass.¶ Once global constitutionalism is understood as the product of a¶ polycentric evolutionary process, it is not difficult to see why the U.S.¶ Constitution is playing an increasingly peripheral role in that process.¶ No evolutionary process favors a species that is frozen in time. At¶ least some of the responsibility for the declining global appeal of¶ American constitutionalism lies not with the Supreme Court, or with a¶ broader penchant for exceptionalism, but rather with the static character¶ of the Constitution itself. If the United States were to revise the¶ Bill of Rights today—with the benefit of over two centuries of experience,¶ and in a manner that addresses contemporary challenges while¶ remaining faithful to the nation’s best traditions—there is no guarantee¶ that other countries would follow its lead. But the world would¶ surely pay close attention.

#### Drone prolif doesn’t escalate

**Singh ’12** [Joseph Singh is a researcher at the Center for a New American Security, an independent and non-partisan organization that focuses on researching and analyzing national security and defense policies, also a research assistant at the Institute for Near East and Gulf Military Analysis (INEGMA) North America, is a War and Peace Fellow at the Dickey Center, a global research organization, “Betting Against a Drone Arms Race,” 8-13-12, <http://nation.time.com/2012/08/13/betting-against-a-drone-arms-race/>]

Bold predictions of a coming drones arms race are all the rage since the uptake in their deployment under the Obama Administration. Noel Sharkey, for example, argues in an August 3 op-ed for the Guardian that rapidly developing drone technology — coupled with minimal military risk — portends an era in which states will become increasingly aggressive in their use of drones.¶ As drones develop the ability to fly completely autonomously, Sharkey predicts a proliferation of their use that will set dangerous precedents, seemingly inviting hostile nations to use drones against one another. Yet, the narrow applications of current drone technology coupled with what we know about state behavior in the international system lend no credence to these ominous warnings.¶ Indeed, critics seem overly-focused on the domestic implications of drone use.¶ In a June piece for the Financial Times, Michael Ignatieff writes that “virtual technologies make it easier for democracies to wage war because they eliminate the risk of blood sacrifice that once forced democratic peoples to be prudent.”¶ Significant public support for the Obama Administration’s increasing deployment of drones would also seem to legitimate this claim. Yet, there remain equally serious diplomatic and political costs that emanate from beyond a fickle electorate, which will prevent the likes of the increased drone aggression predicted by both Ignatieff and Sharkey.¶ Most recently, the serious diplomatic scuffle instigated by Syria’s downing a Turkish reconnaissance plane in June illustrated the very serious risks of operating any aircraft in foreign territory.¶ States launching drones must still weigh the diplomatic and political costs of their actions, which make the calculation surrounding their use no fundamentally different to any other aerial engagement.¶ This recent bout also illustrated a salient point regarding drone technology: most states maintain at least minimal air defenses that can quickly detect and take down drones, as the U.S. discovered when it employed drones at the onset of the Iraq invasion, while Saddam Hussein’s surface-to-air missiles were still active.¶ What the U.S. also learned, however, was that drones constitute an effective military tool in an extremely narrow strategic context. They are well-suited either in direct support of a broader military campaign, or to conduct targeted killing operations against a technologically unsophisticated enemy.¶ In a nutshell, then, the very contexts in which we have seen drones deployed. Northern Pakistan, along with a few other regions in the world, remain conducive to drone usage given a lack of air defenses, poor media coverage, and difficulties in accessing the region.¶ Non-state actors, on the other hand, have even more reasons to steer clear of drones:¶ – First, they are wildly expensive. At $15 million, the average weaponized drone is less costly than an F-16 fighter jet, yet much pricier than the significantly cheaper, yet equally damaging options terrorist groups could pursue.¶ – Those alternatives would also be relatively more difficult to trace back to an organization than an unmanned aerial vehicle, with all the technical and logistical planning its operation would pose.¶ – Weaponized drones are not easily deployable. Most require runways in order to be launched, which means that any non-state actor would likely require state sponsorship to operate a drone. Such sponsorship is unlikely given the political and diplomatic consequences the sponsoring state would certainly face.¶ – Finally, drones require an extensive team of on-the-ground experts to ensure their successful operation. According to the U.S. Air Force, 168 individuals are needed to operate a Predator drone, including a pilot, maintenance personnel and surveillance analysts.¶ In short, the doomsday drone scenario Ignatieff and Sharkey predict results from an excessive focus on rapidly-evolving military technology.¶ Instead, we must return to what we know about state behavior in an anarchistic international order. Nations will confront the same principles of deterrence, for example, when deciding to launch a targeted killing operation regardless of whether they conduct it through a drone or a covert amphibious assault team.¶ Drones may make waging war more domestically palatable, but they don’t change the very serious risks of retaliation for an attacking state. Any state otherwise deterred from using force abroad will not significantly increase its power projection on account of acquiring drones.¶ What’s more, the very states whose use of drones could threaten U.S. security – countries like China – are not democratic, which means that the possible political ramifications of the low risk of casualties resulting from drone use are irrelevant. For all their military benefits, putting drones into play requires an ability to meet the political and security risks associated with their use.¶ Despite these realities, there remain a host of defensible arguments one could employ to discredit the Obama drone strategy. The legal justification for targeted killings in areas not internationally recognized as war zones is uncertain at best.¶ Further, the short-term gains yielded by targeted killing operations in Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen, while debilitating to Al Qaeda leadership in the short-term, may serve to destroy already tenacious bilateral relations in the region and radicalize local populations.¶ Yet, the past decade’s experience with drones bears no evidence of impending instability in the global strategic landscape. Conflict may not be any less likely in the era of drones, but the nature of 21st Century warfare remains fundamentally unaltered despite their arrival in large numbers.

#### China won’t use drones aggressively- rationality checks

**Erickson and Strange 5-29**-13 [Andrew Erickson is an associate professor at the Naval War College and an Associate in Research at Harvard University's Fairbank Centre, Austin Strange is a researcher at the Naval War College's China Maritime Studies Institute, “China has drones. Now how will it use them?” <http://www.nationmultimedia.com/opinion/China-has-drones-Now-how-will-it-use-them-30207095.html>]

Drones, able to dispatch death remotely, without human eyes on their targets or a pilot's life at stake, make people uncomfortable - even when they belong to democratic governments that presumably have some limits on using them for ill. (On May 23, in a major speech, US President Barack Obama laid out what some of those limits are.) An even more alarming prospect is that unmanned aircraft will be acquired and deployed by authoritarian regimes, with fewer checks on their use of lethal force.¶ Those worried about exactly that tend to point their fingers at China. In March, after details emerged that China had considered taking out a drug trafficker in Myanmar with a drone strike, a CNN blog post warned, "Today, it's Myanmar. Tomorrow, it could very well be some other place in Asia or beyond." Around the same time, a National Journal article entitled "When the Whole World Has Drones" teased out some of the consequences of Beijing's drone programme, asking, "What happens if China arms one of its remote-piloted planes and strikes Philippine or Indian trawlers in the South China Sea?"¶ Indeed, the time to fret about when China and other authoritarian countries will acquire drones is over: they have them. The question now is when and how they will use them. But as with its other, less exotic military capabilities, Beijing has cleared only a technological hurdle - and its behaviour will continue to be constrained by politics.¶ China has been developing a drone capacity for over half a century, starting with its reverse engineering of Soviet Lavochkin La-17C target drones that it had received from Moscow in the late 1950s. Today, Beijing's opacity makes it difficult to gauge the exact scale of the programme, but according to Ian Easton, an analyst at the Project 2049 Institute, an American think-tank devoted to Asia-Pacific security matters, by 2011 China's air force alone had over 280 combat drones. In other words, its fleet of unmanned aerial vehicles is already bigger and more sophisticated than all but the United States'; in this relatively new field Beijing is less of a newcomer and more of a fast follower. And the force will only become more effective: the Lijian ("sharp sword" in Chinese), a combat drone in the final stages of development, will make China one of the very few states that have or are building a stealth drone capacity.¶ This impressive arsenal may tempt China to pull the trigger. The fact that a Chinese official acknowledged that Beijing had considered using drones to eliminate the Myanmar drug trafficker, Naw Kham, makes clear that it would not be out of the question for China to launch a drone strike in a security operation against a non-state actor. Meanwhile, as China's territorial disputes with its neighbours have escalated, there is a chance that Beijing would introduce unmanned aircraft, especially since India, the Philippines and Vietnam distantly trail China in drone funding and capacity, and would find it difficult to compete. Beijing is already using drones to photograph the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands it disputes with Japan, as the retired Chinese major-general Peng Guangqian revealed earlier this year, and to keep an eye on movements near the North Korean border.¶ Beijing, however, is unlikely to use its drones lightly. It already faces tremendous criticism from much of the international community for its perceived brazenness in continental and maritime sovereignty disputes. With its leaders attempting to allay notions that China's rise poses a threat to the region, injecting drones conspicuously into these disputes would prove counterproductive. China also fears setting a precedent for the use of drones in East Asian hotspots that the United States could eventually exploit. For now, Beijing is showing that it understands these risks, and to date it has limited its use of drones in these areas to surveillance, according to recent public statements from China's Defence Ministry.¶ What about using drones outside of Chinese-claimed areas? That China did not, in fact, launch a drone strike on the Myanmar drug criminal underscores its caution. According to Liu Yuejin, the director of the anti-drug bureau in China's Ministry of Public Security, Beijing considered using a drone carrying a 20-kilogram TNT payload to bomb Kham's mountain redoubt in northeast Myanmar. Kham had already evaded capture three times, so a drone strike may have seemed to be the best option. The authorities apparently had at least two plans for capturing Kham. The method they ultimately chose was to send Chinese police forces to lead a transnational investigation that ended in April 2012 with Kham's capture near the Myanmar-Laos border. The ultimate decision to refrain from the strike may reflect both a fear of political reproach and a lack of confidence in untested drones, systems, and operators.¶ The restrictive position that Beijing takes on sovereignty in international forums will further constrain its use of drones. China is not likely to publicly deploy drones for precision strikes or in other military assignments without first having been granted a credible mandate to do so. The gold standard of such an authorisation is a resolution passed by the UN Security Council, the stamp of approval that has permitted Chinese humanitarian interventions in Africa and anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. China might consider using drones abroad with some sort of regional authorisation, such as a country giving Beijing explicit permission to launch a drone strike within its territory. But even with the endorsement of the international community or specific states, China would have to weigh any benefits of a drone strike abroad against the potential for mishaps and perceptions that it was infringing on other countries' sovereignty - something Beijing regularly decries when others do it. The limitations on China's drone use are reflected in the country's academic literature on the topic. The bulk of Chinese drone research is dedicated to scientific and technological topics related to design and performance. The articles that do discuss potential applications primarily point to major combat scenarios -such as a conflagration with Taiwan or the need to attack a US aircraft carrier - which would presumably involve far more than just drones. Chinese researchers have thought a great deal about the utility of drones for domestic surveillance and law enforcement, as well as for non-combat-related tasks near China's contentious borders. Few scholars, however, have publicly considered the use of drone strikes overseas.¶ Yet there is a reason why the United States has employed drones extensively despite domestic and international criticism: it is much easier and cheaper to kill terrorists from above than to try to root them out through long and expensive counterinsurgency campaigns. Some similar challenges loom on China's horizon. Within China, Beijing often considers protests and violence in the restive border regions, such as Xinjiang and Tibet, to constitute terrorism. It would presumably consider ordering precision strikes to suppress any future violence there. Even if such strikes are operationally prudent, China's leaders understand that they would damage the country's image abroad, but they prioritise internal stability above all else. Domestic surveillance by drones is a different issue; there should be few barriers to its application in what is already one of the world's most heavily policed societies. China might also be willing to use stealth drones in foreign airspace without authorisation if the risk of detection were low enough; it already deploys intelligence-gathering ships in the exclusive economic zones of Japan and the United States, as well as in the Indian Ocean.¶ Still, although China enjoys a rapidly expanding and cutting-edge drone fleet, it is bound by the same rules of the game as the rest of the military's tools. Beyond surveillance, the other non-lethal military actions that China can take with its drones are to facilitate communications within the Chinese military, support electronic warfare by intercepting electronic communications and jamming enemy systems, and help identify targets for Chinese precision strike weapons, such as missiles. Beijing's overarching approach remains one of caution - something Washington must bear in mind with its own drone programme.

**No South China Sea conflict or escalation – their evidence is media exagerration** – empirical squabbling, costs too high, interdependence, loss of international credibility, U.S. military de-escalates incidents through cooperation and communication

**Kania 13** – The Harvard Political Review is a journal of politics and public policy published by the Institute of Politics, cites Andrew Ring, a former Weatherhead Center for International Affairs Fellow, and Peter Dutton, Director of the China Maritime Studies Institute at the U.S. Naval War College (Elsa, 01/11, “The South China Sea: Flashpoints and the U.S. Pivot,” http://harvardpolitics.com/world/the-south-china-sea-flashpoints-and-the-u-s-pivot/)

Equilibrium and Interdependence? One paradox at the heart of the South China Sea is the uneasy equilibrium that has largely been maintained. **Despite** the occasional confrontation and **frequent** diplomatic **squabbling, the situation has never escalated into full-blown physical conflict**. The main stabilizing factor has been that the countries involved have too much to lose from turmoil, and so much to gain from tranquility. Andrew Ring—former Weatherhead Center for International Affairs Fellow—emphasized that “With respect to the South China Sea, we all have the same goals” in terms of regional stability and development. With regional **trade flows and interdependence** critical to the region’s growing economies, conflict could be devastating. Even for China—the actor with by far the most to gain from such a dispute—taking unilateral action would **irreparably tarnish its image** in the eyes of the international community. With the predominant narrative of a “rising” and “assertive China”—referred to as a potential adversary by President Obama in the third presidential debate—China’s behavior in the South China Sea may be sometimes **exaggerated or sensationalized**. Dr. Auer, former Naval officer and currently Director of the Center for U.S.-Japan Studies and Cooperation at the Vanderbilt Institute for Public Policy Studies, told the HPR that “China has not indicated any willingness to negotiate multilaterally” and remains “very uncooperative.” Across its maritime territorial disputes—particularly through recent tensions with Japan in the East China Sea—Auer sees China as having taken a very aggressive stance, and he claims that “Chinese behavior is not understandable or clear.” Nonetheless, in recent incidents, such as a standoff between China and the Philippines over the Scarborough Shoal this past April, as Bonnie Glaser, Senior Adviser for Asia at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, emphasized, “this is not an either or.” Multiple parties are responsible for the tensions, yet the cycle of action and reaction is **often obscured**. Nonetheless, Glaser believes that “The Chinese have in every one of these cases overreacted—they have sought to take advantage of the missteps of other countries,” responding with disproportionate coercion. In addition, China has begun to use methods of “economic coercion” to assert its interests against trade partners. A Tipping Point? Has the dynamic in the South China Sea shifted recently? Perhaps not in a fundamental sense. But with the regional military buildup, governments have developed a greater capacity to pursue longstanding objectives. According to Peter Dutton, Director of the China Maritime Studies Institute at the U.S. Naval War College, “China’s recent behavior in the East China Sea and assertive policy in the South China Sea” is “a serious concern.” He believes that China’s willingness to resort to force in defense of its territorial claims has been increasing over time, partially as a consequence of its rising power. As such, Dutton sees the situation as reaching a “tipping point in which China is…no longer satisfied with shelving the dispute.” Is confrontation or resolution imminent? Worryingly, Dutton observes, “the international dynamic in the region is motivated largely by fear and anger.” However, **the use of unilateral military force would be a lose-lose for China**,” particularly in terms of its credibility, both among its neighbors and in the international community. The Pivot in the South China Sea From a U.S. perspective, a sustained American presence in the region has long been the underpinning of peace and stability. However, excessive U.S. intervention could disrupt the delicate balance that has been established. Although the U.S. has always sought to maintain a position of neutrality in territorial disputes, remarks by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton that referred to the South China Sea as the “West Philippine Sea” led China to challenge U.S. impartiality. If the U.S. engages with its regional allies without seeking enhanced engagement with China, then U.S. actions in the region may be perceived by China as efforts at containment. Moreover, as the U.S. strengthens ties to partners in the region, there is risk of entanglement if conflict were to break out. There has long been an undercurrent of tension between the Philippines and China—most recently displayed in the standoff over the Scarborough Shoal in May 2012. Shortly thereafter, in a visit to Washington D.C., President Aquino sought U.S. commitment to military support of the Philippines in the event of conflict with China on the basis of the 1952 Mutual Defense Treaty. However, despite providing further military and naval support, the U.S. has refrained from making concrete commitments. Although the U.S. would not necessarily be dragged into a dispute, if a confrontation did break out, it might feel compelled to respond militarily to maintain the credibility of commitments to allies and partners in the region. Strong ties to the U.S. and enhanced military capacity could also provoke more confrontational behavior from U.S. partners. Yet, Ring emphasizes that the U.S. navy and military are also unique in the “ability to facilitate military cooperation and communication among all of the claimants” and particularly to “be that bridge…uniquely situated to build some flows of communication” **that could facilitate a peaceful resolution to future incidents.**

#### No Indo-Pak War

Wright ‘13 (Thomas Wright is a fellow at the Brookings Institution in the Managing Global Order project. Previously, he was executive director of studies at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, a lecturer at the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago, and senior researcher for the Princeton Project on National Security, "Don’t Expect Worsening of India, Pakistan Ties," <http://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2013/01/16/dont-expect-worsening-of-india-pakistan-ties/>, January 16, 2013)

There’s no end for now to the hostile rhetoric between India and Pakistan. But that doesn’t necessarily presage anything more drastic. Pakistan claims another of its soldiers died Tuesday night in firing across the Line of Control in Kashmir, the divided Himalayan region claimed by both nations. Indian army chief, Gen. Bikram Singh, on Wednesday, said Pakistan had opened fire and India retaliated. “If any of their people have died, it would have been in retaliation to their firing,” Gen. Singh said. ”When they fire, we also fire.” It was the latest in tit-for-tat recriminations over deaths in Kashmir that began last week. Pakistan claimed one of its soldiers died on Jan. 6. Two days later, India said Pakistani forces killed two of its soldiers and mutilated the bodies. Tuesday night, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said the mutilations meant it could not be “business as usual” between the countries. That has worried some that peace talks, which have been in train for two years, could be about to break down. Mr. Singh’s comments built on a drumbeat of anger from India. Gen. Singh, Monday called the mutilations “unpardonable” and said India withheld the right to retaliate to Pakistan aggression when and where it chooses. Pakistan Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar, who is in the U.S., Tuesday termed the Indian army chief’s comments as “very hostile.” There are some other worrying signs. India said Tuesday it was delaying the start of a visa-on-arrival program meant to make it easier for some Indians and Pakistanis to visit each other’s countries. The visa program, like talks on opening up bilateral trade, is supposed to pave the way toward broader peace talks that would encompass thornier issues, like how to solve the Kashmir problem. Also Tuesday, nine Pakistani hockey players who had come to participate in a tournament in India were sent home due to fears of protests and violence against them. Still, there’s little benefit for either side to escalate what is now still sporadic firing over the Line of Control, the de facto border in Kashmir. Pakistan is embroiled in its own political meltdown sparked by the Supreme Court’s decision Tuesday to order the arrest of Prime Minister Raja Pervez Ashraf on allegations of corruption. Tens of thousands of protesters Tuesday took to the streets in Islamabad, and remain there today, demanding immediate elections and a greater role for the army and Supreme Court in politics. Pakistan’s military continues to play an important political role, dominating defense and foreign policy. But it has so far shown little sign of mounting a full-blown coup despite persistent rumors of military intervention. Pakistan’s government must hold national elections by May, meaning the next few months are likely to be choppy ones in Pakistan politics. In such an environment, the military is unlikely to want to dial up tensions with India. On the Indian side, despite Mr. Singh’s unusually strident tone Tuesday, there also will be pause before taking matters to the next level. Mr. Singh has put immense personal political capital into trying to improve ties with Pakistan since he came to power in 2004. Last year, he hosted Pakistan President Asif Ali Zardari in New Delhi and promised a return visit. Such a trip is clearly off the table for now. But India still has put too much into peace talks to throw away the progress made so far on visas, trade and other issues. Even Gen. Singh, India’s army chief, Monday said he did not believe the latest flare-up would lead to a broader escalation in violence and an official end to a 2003 ceasefire agreement in Kashmir. The clashes so far, he noted, have been limited to specific areas of the Line of Control.

# 1NC Leadership

#### Systemic opposition dooms leadership- drones aren’t key

**Wike ’12** [Richard Wike is associate director of the Pew Global Attitudes Project, “Wait, You Still Don't Like Us?” September 19, <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/09/19/you_still_don_t_like_us?page=full>]

Anti-Americanism in the Muslim world, an issue that was front and center throughout much of the George W. Bush era, is squarely back in the news following the protests that swept across more than 20 countries in reaction to a controversial anti-Islam film. The all-too-familiar images of angry demonstrators burning the Stars and Stripes are a dramatic reminder that, while the image of the United States has improved throughout many parts of the world during Barack Obama's presidency, negative views of America remain stubbornly persistent in key Muslim countries. Much of this animosity is due to continuing concerns about U.S. power and widespread opposition to major elements of American foreign policy. But it's not just about the United States -- rather, anti-Americanism needs to be seen within a broader context of distrust between Muslims and the West.¶ Following his election, Obama made it a priority to change America's dismal image in the Muslim world, most prominently in his June 2009 Cairo speech. And he has had some successes; in fact, Muslim publics still generally give him more positive ratings than Bush received. For instance, in a spring 2012 survey by the Pew Research Center's Global Attitudes Project, only 24 percent of Turks express confidence in Obama; still, that's a whole lot better than the 2 percent who felt this way about Bush during his final year in office. Also, due in part to having lived there for a few years as a child, Obama has consistently received high marks in Indonesia, and his popularity has helped turn around America's image in the world's most populous Muslim nation.¶ But overall, the picture remains grim. In Egypt, for example, despite all the tumult of the revolution, America's image remains roughly where it was four years ago -- then 22 percent expressed a favorable opinion of the United States; in the 2012 poll, it was 19 percent. Among Pakistanis and Jordanians, America's already poor ratings have declined further since 2008 -- in both countries, 19 percent held a positive view of the U.S. four years ago, compared with just 12 percent in 2012.¶ Why hasn't America's image improved? In part, many Muslims around the world continue to voice the same criticisms of U.S. foreign policy that were common in the Bush years. U.S. anti-terrorism efforts are still widely unpopular. America is still seen as ignoring the interests of other countries. Few think Obama has been even-handed in dealing with the Israelis and the Palestinians. And the current administration's increased reliance on drone strikes to target extremists is overwhelmingly unpopular -- more than 80 percent of Jordanians, Egyptians, and Turks oppose the drone campaign.¶ The opposition to drone strikes points to a broader issue: a widespread distrust of American power. This is especially true when the United States employs hard power, whether it's the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq or the drone attacks in Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen. But it is true even for elements of American soft power. Predominantly Muslim nations are generally among the least likely to embrace U.S. popular culture or the spread of American ideas and customs. Only 36 percent of Egyptians like American music, movies, and television, and just 11 percent believe it is good that U.S. ideas and customs are spreading to their country.¶ But America's image problems are not due solely to fears of American power. In some ways, the issue of anti-Americanism is part of a broader story about mutual distrust between Muslims and Westerners. Polling by Pew in 2006 and 2011 highlighted the extent to which Muslim and Western publics see their relations with each other as bad, and the degree to which they blame each other for the poor state of affairs.¶ In the West, fears about extremism and violence continue to play a role in driving these views. Among Muslims, many describe Westerners as selfish, greedy, and violent, and the 2011 poll found majorities of Muslims in Egypt, the Palestinian territories, Pakistan, and Turkey saying that both Americans and Europeans tend to be hostile toward Muslims. Also, large numbers of Muslims surveyed in 2011 blamed Western policies for the lack of prosperity in Muslim nations.¶ Just like the headlines from the past week, the survey data paint a fairly bleak picture. The "Obama effect" that changed America's battered image in Europe and other parts of the globe did not register in many predominantly Muslim nations. Even so, there are some hopeful signs. For one thing, it is important to keep in mind that the "Muslim world" is not monolithic. In the 2012 Pew survey, two-thirds of Lebanese Sunni Muslims expressed a positive view of the United States. In newly democratic Tunisia, opinions were equally divided, with 45 percent giving the United States a positive rating and 45 percent a negative one. Previous polling found largely positive views of the United States among Muslims in Indonesia and Nigeria following Obama's election.

#### Obama mishandles leadership- no impact

**Lagon ’11** [Mark P. Lagon is the International Relations and Security Chair at Georgetown University's Master of Science in Foreign Service Program and adjunct senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. He is the former US Ambassador-at-Large to Combat Trafficking in Persons at the US Department of State, “The Value of Values: Soft Power Under Obama,” September/October, <http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/value-values-soft-power-under-obama>]

Tne irony of the Obama presidency is how much it relies on hard power. The president came into office proposing a dramatic shift from George W. Bush’s perceived unilateralism, and most of his predecessor’s hard-edged counterterrorism tactics and massive deployments in wars abroad. Yet after three years, Obama has escalated forces in Afghanistan, embraced the widespread use of unmanned drones to kill terrorists at the risk of civilian casualties, kept Guantánamo open, and killed Osama bin Laden in Pakistan in a thoroughly unilateral fashion.¶ What he hasn’t accomplished to any great degree is what most observers assumed would be the hallmark of his approach to foreign affairs—a full assertion of the soft power that makes hard power more effective. His 2008 campaign centered on a critique of President Bush’s overreliance on hard power. Obama suggested he would rehabilitate the damaged image of America created by these excesses and show that the United States was not a cowboy nation. Upon taking office, he made fresh-start statements, such as his June 2009 remarks in Cairo, and embraced political means like dialogue, respectful multilateralism, and the use of new media, suggesting that he felt the soft power to change minds, build legitimacy, and advance interests was the key element missing from the recent US approach to the world—and that he would quickly remedy that defect.¶ Yet President Obama’s conception of soft power has curiously lacked the very quality that has made it most efficacious in the past—the values dimension . This may seem odd for a leader who is seen worldwide as an icon of morality, known for the motto “the audacity of hope” and his deployment of soaring rhetoric. Yet his governance has virtually ignored the values dimension of soft power, which goes beyond the tradecraft of diplomacy and multilateral consultation to aggressively assert the ideals of freedom in practical initiatives. The excision of this values dimension renders soft power a hollow concept.¶ The Obama presidency has regularly avoided asserting meaningful soft power, particularly in its relations with three countries—Iran, Russia, and Egypt—where it might have made a difference not only for those countries but for American interests as well. His reaction to the challenges these countries have posed to the US suggest that it is not soft power itself that Obama doubts, but America’s moral standing to project it.

#### International law doesn’t solve war

**Goldsmith ’05** [Jack, visiting scholar at AEI and a law professor at Harvard University, “The Limits of International Law,” <http://www.angelfire.com/jazz/sugimoto/law.pdf>]

What it does suggest, however, is that international law has no life of its own, has no special normative authority; it is just the working out of relations among states, as they deal with relatively discrete problems of international cooperation. There is no reason to expect states to enter treaties just for the sake of expanding the domain of international law; and there is no reason to expect states to comply with treaties when their interests and powers change. The aggressive international legalization expected and yearned for by international lawyers just cannot happen as long as there are nearly 200 states with independent interests, agendas, and ideologies. Even democratic states have no reason to commit themselves to international law when doing so does not serve the interests of the voters.

#### Soft power is a gimmick- only based on GDP not credibility

Doctorow ’13 (Gilbert Doctorow, Research Fellow of the American University in Moscow, “Soft power is largely an American PR gimmick”, May 20, 2013)

The recent nose-thumbing at Russia and China by Professor Joseph Nye in Foreign Policy magazine over the inability of those countries to marshal soft power is flawed in a number of ways that go beyond the methodological weaknesses of his scholarly writings that I have described at length elsewhere.¹ This article is part of Voice of Russia Experts’ Panel Discussion It is curious that Nye insists soft power is purely the work of a free society and cannot be formed or directed by governments like the Chinese or the Russians, when in his own 2004 master work on the concept he bemoaned the cutbacks in US government-financed image projection by the USIA going back to the end of the Cold War. And in the same work he listed steps that Washington should do to promote soft power, including educational and military exchanges, liberalization of visas and the like. I have long agreed with Nye that the Kremlin’s efforts at exercising soft power have often been inept. For example, the Valdai Discussion Club meetings have only flattered fat-cat American academics who, after their photo opportunity with Vladimir Putin, returned home and laid into Russia with even greater vigor from their university and think-tank perches. At the same time, Russia’s cultural icons are genuinely very popular abroad. The Hermitage Amsterdam is a world-class calling card that carries weight greater than the humbler British Council or Alliance Française installations. The Mariinsky Theater, newly launched into a Lincoln Center type complex with the opening of its second stage, enjoys worldwide respect both on tour and at home during the White Nights Festival. Friends in the travel industry assure me that the coming summer season bookings of upper middle-class American tourists to Moscow, St Petersburg and the Golden Triangle are at a multi-year high. There is not much in all of this for the Kremlin to use in furtherance of its foreign policy objectives. But then the fact that Hilary Clinton chose Nye as the State Department’s house philosopher during her tenure did not change the substance of Obama’s foreign policy even if it may have influenced the sound bites. And it could not be otherwise, because soft power is largely a public relations gimmick. Since Nye is an idealist rather than a realist, he systematically fails to understand that soft power is above all a by-product of wealth and success. America’s undisputed power of attraction to peoples around the world (when it is not invading hapless countries) has more to do with its per capita GDP than with any other factor. This explains the passion of ambitious people everywhere to send their children to American colleges, whatever their ratings. It explains the popularity of Hollywood and pop culture and much more. There is nothing wrong with this; it is all understandable in human terms. But it has relatively little to do with vibrant civil society or any beacon of human rights radiating from Washington, D.C. In this respect, the best thing that Russia or China can do to further their soft power is to get richer quick. In the meantime, Beijing and Moscow would be wise to keep their eyes on the ball, that is on their hard power. If you can’t be loved, it is quite sufficient to be respected. 1. The underlying notion of soft power can be sufficiently explained in a sentence or two. Nye has written volumes. However, his “research” is utterly indiscriminating and he is enthralled by new media. See my critique in Great Post-Cold War American Thinkers on International Relations (2010)

# 1NC Terror

#### Blowback is small- benefits outweigh

**ICG 5-21**-13 [International Crisis Group, an independent, non-profit, non-governmental organisation, with some 150 staff members on five continents, working through field-based analysis, “Drones: ¶ Myths and ¶ Reality in ¶ Pakistan,” <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/pakistan/247-drones-myths-and-reality-in-pakistan.pdf>]

In debates on the drone issue, the argument is commonly put forward that drones produce more terrorists than they kill: militant groups exploit real and fabricated ¶ accounts of civilian deaths to enlist fresh recruits, including the relatives of drone ¶ strike victims, for jihad against the U.S. and its allies.133 The actual benefit to extremist groups, including in terms of recruitment, appears, however, minimal. A local analyst who has extensively researched security and governance in FATA notes that ¶ while anti-drone rhetoric does draw some converts, “the loss of a Baitullah Mehsud or a Qari Hussain is much more damaging than the recruitment of a few dozen foot soldiers”.134¶ Moreover, militant recruitment is a complex process, achieved more often on economic than ideological grounds. FATA residents often rely on various militant ¶ jihadi and criminal networks for patronage in the absence of a functioning state, civil ¶ society, and traditional tribal structures that have been decimated by militants. Forced recruitment is also common, with households in militant-controlled areas made to ¶ contribute men to the jihad.135 Any voluntary enlistment in response to drone strikes may well be comparatively minimal.

#### No EU backlash to drones- they’re passive

**Dworkin ‘13** [Anthony, Anthony Dworkin is a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, was previously the executive director of the Crimes of War Project, “Drones and Targeted Killing: Defining a European Position,” July, <http://ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR84_DRONES_BRIEF.pdf>]

The US use of drones for targeted killing away from any ¶ battlefield has become the focus of increasing attention ¶ and concern in Europe. In a recent opinion poll, people ¶ in all European countries sampled were opposed to the ¶ use of drones to kill extremists outside the battlefield and ¶ a large majority of European legal scholars reject the legal ¶ justification offered for these attacks.2¶ But European leaders and officials have responded to the US campaign of drone strikes in a muted and largely passive way. Although some ¶ European officials have made their disagreement with ¶ the legal claims underlying US policies clear in closeddoor dialogues and bilateral meetings, EU member state representatives have said almost nothing in public about US drone strikes.3¶ The EU has so far failed to set out ¶ any vision of its own about when the use of lethal force ¶ against designated individuals is legitimate. Nor is there any indication that European states have made a serious effort to influence the development of US policy or to begin ¶ discussions on formulating common standards for the kinds ¶ of military operations that UAVs facilitate.

#### Alt causes to recruitment and US legitimacy

**Smith et al ’11** [Adam, Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies Task Force Advisor, along with Task Force members Alexander Bezovics Joseph Corigliano Gillian Frackelton Linn Gracey Jonathan Humphrey Joelle Jackson Alexander Jeffers Juliana Mendel Grasilda Mincin Peter Muller Arya Nazari Matthew Paulhus Vanja Radunovic Allison Stone Matthew Wright Kristen Zipperer, “Countering al-Qaeda’s Ideology: Re-Asessing U.S. Policy Ten Years After 9/11,” <https://digital.lib.washington.edu/researchworks/bitstream/handle/1773/16495/Task%20Force%20O%202011.pdf?sequence=1>]

The US is losing the message war in three ways. First, too many of its policies have not, and do not align with the message of cooperative coexistence, and al-Qaeda uses these discontinuities as fodder for propaganda. The term cooperative coexistence embodies the values outlined in the May 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS) and provides a concise term to evaluate U.S. policies. Second, the message of coexistence has not been effectively articulated to the Muslim world. Third, the U.S. has not adequately conveyed the violence al-Qaeda has perpetrated against Muslims. The U.S. needs to better show this destruction and violence in order to discredit alQaeda in the Muslim world. After September 11 th , the Bush administration pursued a message framed along ideological lines, wrapped within the term ―Global War on Terror.‖ 37 America‘s message was that al-Qaeda presents an existential threat to the world system and America‘s moral foundation. 38 However, the ideological rhetoric, the emphasis on preemptive strike, and associations made between Islam and terrorism alienated the greater Muslim population and fed into al-Qaeda‘s message. Furthermore, the broad policy decisions—unbalanced support for Israel and the inability to peacefully resolve the Israel-Palestine conflict, the Iraq invasion, and continued presence in Afghanistan—substantiated al-Qaeda‘s message and further discredited the U.S. The Iraq Invasion’s Impact on Muslim Perceptions The decision to invade Iraq corroded Muslim perception of the U.S. and fostered radicalization. The image of a Western power invading and occupying an Islamic nation substantiates the message that the U.S. is at war with Islam. As early as 2004, a Pew Global Attitudes Project survey found that a majority of Muslim nations, and a number of Western allies, believed the Iraq invasion undermined US efforts to combat al-Qaeda and fomented radicalization. 39 Prior to the troop surge in 2007, only twenty-nine percent of the global population felt that the U.S. was having a positive impact in the Muslim world despite a marked increase in US media saturation in the Middle East. 40,41 Furthermore, there was support among Muslim nations for attacks against U.S. forces in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Persian Gulf. 42 The reasons for invasion— securing potential weapons of mass destruction and liberating an oppressed people—were not communicated properly and were not believed by the Muslim audience. Future policy decisions must weigh the immediate tactical importance of invasion with both the sharp reduction in positive attitude towards the U.S. and the use of military intervention as propaganda. Additionally, any military action must coincide with explanations of the reasons for intervention and be expressed through channels that will engage the target audience. Abu Ghraib and Mounting anti-American Propaganda The Abu Ghraib scandal fed into fears that the U.S. disregards Islamic culture, fueling anti-U.S. propaganda. A Senate Armed Services Committee Inquiry into the Treatment of Detainees in U.S. Custody found that ―treating detainees harshly only reinforces [the view that the U.S. is at war with Islam], increases resistance to cooperation, and creates new enemies.‖ 43 Further, the April 2006 National Intelligence Estimate cited pervasive anti-American sentiment as an ―underlying factor fueling the spread of the global jihadist movement.‖ 44 General Petraeus has called the incident a ―non-biodegradable‖ event, stating that ―the human terrain is the decisive terrain.‖ 45 While the incident is an aberration in the processing of detainees, and anything but official U.S. policy, oversight should be extended throughout the Department of Defense to ensure that U.S. values are consistently upheld. While a strategic communications plan which attempts to explain U.S. detainee policies may alleviate discord caused by such incidents, the result of this event cannot be rectified through U.S. messaging alone. The trust gap between U.S. messages and Muslim populations is too great. Regional allies must make it clear that an important aspect of the fight against the spread of al-Qaeda‘s ideology is incarceration/interrogation, and that Abu Ghraib is not representative of U.S. policies towards Muslims. The Ground Zero Mosque and Quran Burning: Muslim perception of American Attitudes Recently, two events have further strained Muslim perception of the U.S.—the debate over building a Muslim community center and mosque near Ground Zero, and the planned burning of Qurans on 11 September 2010, the 9 th anniversary of the World Trade Center attacks. Opponents of the mosque claim the center will be used as a source for domestic radicalization. 46 Such an argument sends the message that the U.S. is at odds with Islam, not al-Qaeda and its violent ideology. The opposing argument is weakened by the fact that Imam Rauf, the project‘s coordinator, has been sent on diplomatic missions by both Presidents Bush and Obama to spread pro-American sentiment. 47 The State Department distributes his book, What's Right with Islam: a New Vision for Muslims and the West, to promote American values abroad. 48 He is a vocal proponent of the U.S. to Muslim audiences. While President Obama initially provided tentative COUNTERING AL-QAEDA’S IDEOLOGY: RE-ASSESSING U.S. POLICY TEN YEARS AFTER 9/11 TASK FORCE 2011 21 support, stating that all citizens have ―the right to build a place of worship and a community center on private property in Lower Manhattan,‖ 49 the following day he retracted, stating, ―I was not commenting, and I will not comment, on the wisdom of making a decision to put a mosque there.‖ 50 This debate alienates a successful, pro-American, moderate Muslim voice—one which has championed American tolerance. Again, while not official U.S. policy, such events are a significant liability to U.S. image, and the commitment to U.S. values must be articulated in the official response. In remembrance of 9/11, Pastor Terry Jones, who preaches at the Dove World Outreach Center in Gainesville, Florida, decided to burn Qurans, a grievous offense to Muslims sure to incite antiAmerican violence. Muslim intellectual and fellow at the Brookings Institute M. A. Muqtedar Khan states ―Quran desecration represents the spiritual, emotional and psychological torture of all Muslims‖. 51 The official American response, in contrast to the debate over the Ground Zero Mosque, was quick to admonish Jones. General Petraeus warned that video of the incident would be used much the same way as Abu Ghraib, ―to incite violence and to enflame public opinion against [the US] and against [the] mission here in Afghanistan‖, 52 the Presidents of Pakistan and Indonesia also warned such an event would incite violence. 53 The Obama administration, fearing increased recruitment, provided a strong rebuttal of Jones. 54 The official response successfully discredited him, and the event was cancelled. In contrast to the mosque debate, the U.S. successfully conveyed coexistence. The confluence of official policy and the actions of a minority radical wing in the U.S. mirrors the position of al-Qaeda in the Middle East. Al-Qaeda is a minority presence and promotes a minority ideology. The message the U.S. sends must not only emphasize the distance between mainstream American perceptions of Islam and Reverend Jones, but emphasize, in similar terms, that the U.S. understands al-Qaeda to be a fringe element in the Islamic World. Additionally, U.S. media highlighting respect for Islam and the fringe-nature of al-Qaeda would provide a succinct counter-narrative to propaganda, which uses both the debate of building the mosque and the planned Quran burning to fuel anti-American sentiment.

#### Zero evidence saying Europe stops cooperating on terrorism- their cards just say it’s an area of friction, not potential collapse

#### US-EU cooperation is resilient

**Mix ’13** [Derek E. Mix, Analyst in European Affairs at the Congressional Research Service, “The United States and Europe: Current Issues,” March 30, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22163.pdf>]

Due to extensive cooperation on a wide range of issues, the relationship between the United ¶ States and Europe is often called the transatlantic partnership. The two sides have many common ¶ values and concerns, and have grown increasingly interdependent in terms of security and ¶ prosperity. The transatlantic relationship and the main areas of U.S.-European cooperation and ¶ shared interest are likely to have continuing implications for U.S. policy during the 113th¶ Congress. Members of Congress may have an interest in considering the dimensions and ¶ dynamics of current issues in U.S.-European relations in the course of oversight or legislative ¶ activities, or in the context of direct interactions with European legislators and officials. ¶ According to most observers, the overall tone of transatlantic relations during the Obama ¶ Administration has been largely positive. At the same time, a constructive tone does not ¶ necessarily translate into tangible results with regard to foreign policy objectives or other goals. ¶ With respect to certain issues, such as terrorist detainee policy or climate change, U.S. and ¶ European policies have often been at odds and have generated frictions in the relationship from time to time. ¶ This report selects a number of issues that both illustrate the nature of U.S.-European cooperation ¶ based on shared interests and present challenges in terms of the efficacy of such cooperation: ¶ • The United States and the European Union (EU) have the largest trade and ¶ investment relationship in the world. Over the past several years, the Eurozone ¶ crisis has posed a danger to economic recovery and financial stability worldwide. ¶ Members of Congress and Administration officials have been concerned about ¶ the potential effects of the crisis, but avenues for U.S. involvement in resolving it ¶ have remained limited. In early 2013, the United States and the EU announced ¶ their intention to begin negotiations on a comprehensive Transatlantic Trade and ¶ Investment Partnership aimed at boosting jobs and growth on both sides. ¶ • The United States and Europe continue to cooperate closely on a wide range of ¶ foreign policy and international security issues. Many of these challenges are in ¶ the wider Middle East region: countering Iran’s nuclear ambitions, seeking to halt ¶ the violence in Syria, adjusting to the regional transitions of the so-called “Arab ¶ Spring,” and managing the transfer and withdrawal of U.S. and European troops ¶ in Afghanistan. Managing difficult relations with Russia also remains a priority ¶ and common interest of both the United States and Europe. Additionally, in the ¶ context of the pending conclusion of operations in Afghanistan and low defense ¶ spending in many European countries, officials and analysts continue to debate a ¶ number of on-going questions about the future role and capabilities of NATO. ¶ • Europe remains both a primary target of radical Islamist terrorists and a potential ¶ base for those seeking to carry out attacks against the United States. Transatlantic ¶ counterterrorism cooperation has been strong since the terrorist attacks of 9/11, ¶ although U.S.-EU differences regarding data privacy have posed some key ¶ information-sharing challenges. ¶ • Cybersecurity issues have received growing attention and emphasis on both sides ¶ of the Atlantic. Although some differences exist regarding regulation of the ¶ Internet, the United States and the EU have pursued initiatives to deepen ¶ cybersecurity cooperation and counter cybercrime. • In 2012, the U.S. Congress passed legislation prohibiting U.S. aircraft operators ¶ from participating in the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS). Airlines ¶ participating in the ETS must purchase carbon allowances in order to offset CO2 ¶ emissions. The EU has delayed implementing the international application of the ¶ ETS for aviation pending negotiations on a broader multilateral agreement. ¶ • Concerned by Europe’s reliance on Russian energy, many U.S. officials and ¶ analysts regard European energy security as a U.S. interest. With its energy ¶ import needs expected to rise, Europe has had mixed success in seeking ways to ¶ diversify its energy supplies and consolidate its internal energy market. ¶ As the United States and Europe face a changing geopolitical environment, some ¶ observers assert that the global influence of the Euro-Atlantic partnership is in decline. In ¶ addition, the Obama Administration’s announced “re-balancing” toward Asia has caused ¶ some anxiety among Europeans. Overall, however, most analysts maintain that the ¶ United States and Europe are likely to remain one another’s closest partner, and that U.S.-¶ European cooperation is likely to remain the foundation of international action on a wide ¶ range of critical issues.

# T

#### The only War Power authority is the ability to MAKE MILITARY DECISIONS

Bajesky 13 (2013¶ Mississippi College Law Review¶ 32 Miss. C. L. Rev. 9¶ LENGTH: 33871 words ARTICLE: Dubitable Security Threats and Low Intensity Interventions as the Achilles' Heel of War Powers NAME: Robert Bejesky\* BIO: \* M.A. Political Science (Michigan), M.A. Applied Economics (Michigan), LL.M. International Law (Georgetown). The author has taught international law courses for Cooley Law School and the Department of Political Science at the University of Michigan, American Government and Constitutional Law courses for Alma College, and business law courses at Central Michigan University and the University of Miami.)

A numerical comparison indicates that the Framer's intended for Congress to be the dominant branch in war powers. Congressional war powers include the prerogative to "declare war;" "grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal," which were operations that fall short of "war"; "make Rules for Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces;" "organize, fund, and maintain the nation's armed forces;" "make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water," "raise and support Armies," and "provide and maintain a Navy." [n25](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.771738.1261791409&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T17974748742&parent=docview&rand=1376677997032&reloadEntirePage=true#n25) In contrast, the President is endowed with one war power, named as the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy. [n26](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.771738.1261791409&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T17974748742&parent=docview&rand=1376677997032&reloadEntirePage=true#n26)¶ The Commander-in-Chief authority is a core preclusive power, predominantly designating that the President is the head of the military chain of command when Congress activates the power. [n27](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.771738.1261791409&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T17974748742&parent=docview&rand=1376677997032&reloadEntirePage=true#n27) Moreover, peripheral Commander-in-Chief powers are bridled by statutory and treaty restrictions [n28](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.771738.1261791409&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T17974748742&parent=docview&rand=1376677997032&reloadEntirePage=true#n28) because the President "must respect any constitutionally legitimate restraints on the use of force that Congress has enacted." [n29](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.771738.1261791409&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T17974748742&parent=docview&rand=1376677997032&reloadEntirePage=true#n29) However, even if Congress has not activated war powers, the President does possess inherent authority to expeditiously and unilaterally react to defend the nation when confronted with imminent peril. [n30](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.771738.1261791409&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T17974748742&parent=docview&rand=1376677997032&reloadEntirePage=true#n30) Explicating the intention behind granting the President this latitude, Alexander Hamilton explained that "it is impossible to foresee or to define the extent and variety of national exigencies, or the correspondent extent and variety of the means which may be necessary to satisfy them." [n31](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.771738.1261791409&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T17974748742&parent=docview&rand=1376677997032&reloadEntirePage=true#n31) The Framers drew a precise distinction by specifying that the President was empowered "to repel and not to commence war." [n32](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.771738.1261791409&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T17974748742&parent=docview&rand=1376677997032&reloadEntirePage=true#n32)

### Restrict means Ban

#### Restriction is a prohibition

Northglenn 11 (City of Northglenn Zoning Ordinance, “Rules of Construction – Definitions”, http://www.northglenn.org/municode/ch11/content\_11-5.html)

Section 11-5-3. Restrictions. As used in this Chapter 11 of the Municipal Code, the **term "restriction**" shall mean a prohibitive regulation. Any use, activity, operation, building, structure or thing which is the subject of a restriction is prohibited, and no such use, activity, operation, building, structure or thing shall be **authorized by any permit or license**.

#### **Restrictions can mean BAN**

Supreme Court of Delaware 83 (THE MAYOR AND COUNCIL OF NEW CASTLE, a municipal corporation of the State of Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellant, v. ROLLINS OUTDOOR ADVERTISING, INC., Defendant Below, Appellee, No. 155, 1983, 475 A.2d 355; 1984 Del. LEXIS 324, November 21, 1983, Submitted, April 2, 1984, Decided)

The term "restrict" is defined as: To restrain within bounds; to limit; [\*\*9] to confine. Id. at 1182. The Supreme Court of the United States has recognized that HN5the term "regulate" necessarily entails a possible prohibition of some kind. That Court has stated: "It is an oft-repeated truism that every regulation necessarily speaks as a prohibition." Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 592, 8 L. Ed. 2d 130, 82 S. Ct. 987 (1962). The Supreme Court of Massachusetts in reviewing a statute containing language similar to that found in 22 Del.C. § 301 (which empowered municipalities to "regulate and restrict" outdoor advertising on public ways, in public places, and on private property within public view) held that the statute in question authorized a town to provide, through amortization, for the elimination of nonconforming off-site signs five years from the time the ordinance was enacted. The court held that the Massachusetts enabling act: Conferred on the Legislature plenary power to regulate and restrict outdoor advertising . . . . Although the word "prohibit" was omitted from [the enabling act], it was recognized that the unlimited and unqualified power to regulate and restrict can be, for practical purposes, the power to prohibit [\*\*10] "because under such power the thing may be so far restricted that there is nothing left of of it." (Citations omitted.) The court continued its discussions of the two terms by stating: The distinction between regulation and outright prohibition is often considered to be a narrow one: "that regulation may take the character of prohibition, in proper cases, is well established by the decisions of this court" . . . quoting from United States v. Hill, 248 U.S. 420, 425, 63 L. Ed. 337, 39 S. Ct. 143 (1919). John Donnelly and Sons, Inc. v. Outdoor Advertising Board, Mass. Supr., 369 Mass. 206, 339 N.E.2d 709 (1975). We hold that, through Article II, Section 25 of the Delaware Constitution and 22 Del.C. § 301, the General Assembly has authorized New Castle to terminate nonconforming off-site signs upon reasonable notice, that is, by what has come to be known as amortization. We hold that the power to "regulate and restrict" as such term applies to zoning matters includes the power, upon reasonable notice, to prohibit some of those uses already in existence.

#### Drones key to counter-terror- they disrupt operations and communication, decapitate leaders and key specialists, eliminate save havens and training grounds- that’s Byman.

### Impact Wall – 2NC

#### o/w on timeframe

#### Causes cascade proliferation and miscalculation that quickly goes nuclear (turns the prolif advg)- it’s the quickest and most probable impact

**Russell ‘09** [James A., Senior Lecturer, National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, (Spring) “Strategic Stability Reconsidered: Prospects for Escalation and Nuclear War in the Middle East” IFRI, Proliferation Papers, #26, http://www.ifri.org/downloads/PP26\_Russell\_2009.pdf]

Strategic stability in the region is thus undermined by various factors: (1) asymmetric interests in the bargaining framework that can introduce unpredictable behavior from actors; (2) the presence of non-state actors that introduce unpredictability into relationships between the antagonists; (3) incompatible assumptions about the structure of the deterrent relationship that makes the bargaining framework strategically unstable; (4) perceptions by Israel and the United States that its window of opportunity for military action is closing, which could prompt a preventive attack; (5) the prospect that Iran’s response to pre-emptive attacks could involve unconventional weapons, which could prompt escalation by Israel and/or the United States; (6) the lack of a communications framework to build trust and cooperation among framework participants. These systemic weaknesses in the coercive bargaining framework all suggest that escalation by any the parties could happen either on purpose or as a result of miscalculation or the pressures of wartime circumstance. Given these factors, it is disturbingly easy to imagine scenarios under which a conflict could quickly escalate in which the regional antagonists would consider the use of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. It would be a mistake to believe the nuclear taboo can somehow magically keep nuclear weapons from being used in the context of an unstable strategic framework. Systemic asymmetries between actors in fact suggest a certain increase in the probability of war – a war in which escalation could happen quickly and from a variety of participants. Once such a war starts, events would likely develop a momentum all their own and decision-making would consequently be shaped in unpredictable ways. The international community must take this possibility seriously, and muster every tool at its disposal to prevent such an outcome, which would be an unprecedented disaster for the peoples of the region, with substantial risk for the entire world.

#### Turns the case-

#### Turns terrorism because there’s more loose fissile material for them to steal

#### Cooperation is key to solve terrorism- Saudis have unique intel

**Murphy ‘10** [Caryle, Saudi Arabia correspondent for GlobalPost, long-time reporter for the Washington Post, Pulitzer Prize for International Reporting and the George Polk Award for Foreign Reporting for coverage of the Persian Gulf War, “Saudi Arabia changes game in terror fight,” 11-6 [www.globalpost.com/dispatch/saudi-arabia/101105/saudi-arabia-yemen-al-qaeda-bomb-plot](http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/saudi-arabia/101105/saudi-arabia-yemen-al-qaeda-bomb-plot)]

In 2007, Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz publicly lamented that “no action was taken” on a tip about terrorist plots that his government had passed to London before the horrific 2005 attacks on its public transport system, which left 52 people dead. Three years later, the king can make no such complaints. When Saudi Deputy Interior Minister Prince Muhammad bin Nayef recently called White House counterterrorism chief John O. Brennan to tell him that Al Qaeda’s most industrious affiliate had express-mailed bombs to the United States, the U.S. intelligence community swung into high gear to locate the packages. The different responses highlight major developments that bode well for the international effort to isolate and disrupt Al Qaeda-like terrorist networks such as Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), the Yemen-based group which on Friday said it had mailed the bombs, and which is widely considered one of the most dangerous Al Qaeda branches. The first change has been big improvements in Saudi Arabia’s counterterrorism capabilities, resulting in more accurate inside information about extremist Islamic networks. Unlike the information that Riyadh passed to London, which British intelligence officials at the time said was not relevant to the 2005 attacks, the news conveyed to Brennan by Prince Muhammad was precise and detailed. According to media reports, it included tracking numbers on the packages which were addressed to Chicago locations. “The most important point here is that the Saudis have been a major asset in counterterrorism warnings in the last two months,” said Theodore Karasik, director of research and development at the Dubai-based Institute for Near East and Gulf Military Analysis. “It appears that the information they’re getting recently is extraordinarily accurate.” French officials last month praised Riyadh for alerting them to potential terrorist attacks in Europe, specifically in France. Saudi Arabia’s improved intelligence on AQAP in Yemen, which shares a rugged, mountainous border with Saudi Arabia, appears to result not only from increased electronic surveillance of the organization, but also from more successful infiltration by Saudi spies, experts said. “There’s been an incredible investment of U.S. time and expertise in helping the Saudis develop their intelligence capabilities,” said Jarret Brachman, author of “Global Jihadism: Theory and Practice.” “They’ve really come a long way ... and have developed an independent capability … that’s moved much more into human intelligence collection.” Thomas Hegghammer, author of “Jihad in Saudi Arabia,” said that “the fact that the Saudis are helping [with intelligence tips] is not new. They have done so for a long time. What’s new and interesting is that they seem to have infiltrated the organization on some level. And that’s very rare. Al Qaeda is notoriously hard to infiltrate.” In the past, added Hegghammer, a research fellow at the Norwegian Defense Research Establishment, the Saudis “relied mainly on signals intelligence and tips from the public.” Press reports quoting unnamed Yemeni security officials have said that crucial information, which led to uncovering the potentially disastrous cargo bomb scheme, came from a Saudi militant who recently abandoned AQAP in Yemen and surrendered to Saudi officials. The return last month of Jabir Al Fayfi, 35, a former detainee at Guantanamo, was portrayed by Saudi officials as the decision of a man who realized he had made a mistake. They said he had called officials he met while in a Saudi program to rehabilitate extremists and asked for their help in giving himself up. If this description of Al Fayfi’s change of heart is accurate, it would boost the prestige of the rehabilitation program, which is a major component of Saudi Arabia’s fight against militants, because it suggests that it can lead to intelligence coups. The program endeavors to wean extremists from their radical mindset and reintegrate them into Saudi society through financial inducements and family pressures. A second major change in recent years has been growing mutual awareness by both Saudi Arabia and Western governments that they share a common enemy — radical Islamist terrorist groups. For groups like AQAP, “Saudi Arabia is the near enemy and the United States is the far enemy, and the two go hand-in-hand,” said Robert Pape, a University of Chicago political science professor and founder of the Chicago Project on Security and Terrorism. This mutual recognition has led to greater cooperation, added Karasik. “The threat to all of them is the same, so they are able to coordinate or at least appreciate each other’s interest in preventing something catastrophic” being done by groups like AQAP. In AQAP, however, there is something else that makes for greater cooperation between Riyadh and Washington: Both Saudis and Americans hold key jobs in the extremist organization, which also claimed responsibility for training the Nigerian man who tried to blow up an American airliner over Detroit last Christmas Day.

#### Saudi nukes turn Indo-Pak war

Roberts ‘11 [Andrew Roberts, fellow of the Royal Society of Literature,"Iran's Nuclear Domino Effect," Jan 2, 2011, [www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2011/01/02/irans-nuclear-weapons-could-lead-to-a-saudi-and-pakistan-alliance.html](http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2011/01/02/irans-nuclear-weapons-could-lead-to-a-saudi-and-pakistan-alliance.html)]

The Saudis have already indicated privately—and WikiLeaks has done nothing to cast doubt on this—that when what Edelman terms “the nuclear cascade” is unleashed once Iran goes nuclear, they will be in the first wave. “Saudi Arabia is the lynchpin,” says Edelman, “the key country.” The extremely close links between the two Sunni countries Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, which go back at least as far as 1979 when Pakistan helped to clear Islamic fundamentalists out of the Grand Mosque, and A.Q. Khan’s time in Saudi Arabia at precisely the time when his nuclear-proliferation ring was at its most active, invite what Edelman guardedly calls “speculation” that a mutually convenient arrangement would be arrived at very soon after Iran went nuclear. “We in the West have gotten fat, dumb, and happy when contemplating a relatively stable nuclear Southern Asia over the past decade. It might not stay like that.” “Pakistan could sell operational nuclear weapons and delivery systems to Saudi Arabia,” states Edelman, “or it could provide the Saudis with the infrastructure, material, and the technical support they need to produce nuclear weapons themselves within a matter of years, as opposed to a decade or longer.” The Saudis might not even, technically at least, be violating the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty if the weapons remained operated by the Pakistanis, albeit on Saudi territory. Nor does Congress consider this all to be mere “speculation” either: The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Staff Report of February 2008 stated that there was “some circumstantial evidence” to suggest that an agreement of some sort might already exist between the two countries. Where Edelman goes an important stage further than anyone else is in considering the instability that would inevitably result in Southern Asia if Pakistan gained the capability in Saudi Arabia to withstand a first strike from India’s nuclear arsenal. “To have a second-strike capability against India would give Pakistan a huge benefit,” he told me. “It would be very troublesome for the Indians, who would face a far more complex nuclear picture. We in the West have gotten fat, dumb, and happy when contemplating a relatively stable nuclear Southern Asia over the past decade. It might not stay like that.” With Pakistan already ahead of India in nuclear weapons technology, especially in delivery capabilities, Edelman believes that the Islamabad option will make the nuclear situation in South Asia significantly more dangerous.

#### Perception of a loss of US support threatens dollar primacy—collapses the global economy

**Freeman ’04** [Chas, Middle East Policy Council President, 9/17, Federal News Service, p. lexis]

The second matter, and far more grave in many ways, is **the demonstration of the end of the special relationship with Saudi Arabia;** the end of the discounts and **the end of the Saudi emphasis on primacy in the American market signals** -- because there's another issue you didn't mention, which we will get into, and that **is the part of this special relationship has been the defense of the dollar by the Saudis. Twice within OPEC**, other members, Iran in particular, **have moved to eliminate the dollar as the unit of account for the oil trade. Were this to occur in the** current context of massive budget, balance of trade and balance of payments, deficits for the United States, the results could be absolutely devastating to the global economy **and to our own**. The reason the Saudis defended the dollar on the two previous occasions was **not economic analysis but** political affinity for the United States. Question **if that affinity is no longer there, will they play that role?** And this is a large issue with people like Paul Volcker, saying there is a very substantial danger within the next five years of some sort of dollar collapse, and this is not a minor, minor matter.

### UQ – Relations High – Terror Cooperation

#### US-Saudi relations are high now – counter terrorism cooperation is the leading issue that creates cooperation

Boucek 11 (Christopher, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Christopher, "Terrorism Out of Saudi Arabia")

This is one of the better relationships in the world on counterterrorism. The cooperation between Washington and Riyadh is strong and on the issue of terrorism the Saudis and Americans basically see eye to eye. There is also a regular exchange of information to help both countries prevent attacks.   This was not the case for the first few years after 9/11, as Saudi Arabia did not fully appreciate the problem. But when violence started in Saudi Arabia in 2003, the relationship with the United States on terrorism improved markedly and quickly grew strong. Now there are programs to improve the security of Saudi’s energy infrastructure, training, officials share databases, photos, fingerprints, etc., and there is a great deal of cooperation on Yemen where there are Saudis hiding out and operating with AQAP.   The relationship today shows how two governments can cooperate. If every country was willing to cooperate like Saudi Arabia, the world would be a much safer place. There are two things that are needed to fight terrorism—political will and capacity. Saudi Arabia has demonstrated both. Other countries haven’t. Saudi Arabia recognized that it was at risk of terrorism and then focused a great deal of attention on the problem.

### UQ – Relations High – AT: Syria

#### Counter-terrorism cooperation is still high – Syria isn’t a large enough sticking point

Bronson 8/21/13 (Rachel, Vice President for Programs at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, "Friend or Foe? It Depends on the Agenda?."

Is Saudi Arabia an important ally in Washington’s push for democratization in the Middle East? It never has been, and it won’t be in the foreseeable future. Riyadh’s obvious fears about democratization have only been compounded by election results in Iraq, the Palestinian territories, and the chaos wrought in Syria’s transition. Is Saudi Arabia an important ally in promoting other geopolitical and geoeconomic goals that the U.S. has defined in its national interest? Yes. It stands staunchly opposed to Iran’s growing regional influence. It is a key player in the robust international sanctions against Iran, a signature accomplishment on the Obama administration’s first term. Riyadh has also helped keep global attention focused on Iran’s developing nuclear program. This can be added to the deep cooperation Washington and Riyadh have established on counterterrorism operations, another priority for the Obama administration. The Kingdom has also continued its traditional role of ensuring the free flow of oil at reasonable prices, something necessary to global economic growth, another important U.S. objective.¶ It is true that the Saudi agenda might differ from Washington’s in Syria, but the operative term here is "might," as it’s not entirely clear what Washington’s preferred goal is there.

### AT: We Make Drones More Effective

You bog down more

It doesn’t matter what the real material effects of the plan are because it’s all about Saudi perception

#### Saudi fears that ANY removal of pressure from terrorist organizations will cause a resurgent extremism

Boucek 11 (Christopher, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Christopher, "Terrorism Out of Saudi Arabia")

There are no high-level operators from al-Qaeda or similar outfits at large in Saudi Arabia today. The most-wanted terrorists are no longer inside the country, but if Riyadh were to ease up on the pressure being applied on violent extremism and terrorism, there is a real possibility that violence could return. Sympathy for their cause remains inside the country.   The number of people behind bars suspected of having terrorist ties fluctuates. Before 9/11, there were 192 prisoners in Saudi Arabia detained for terrorism and related allegations. But after terrorist activity came to Saudi soil with a vengeance in 2003, there were over 11,000 people interrogated and eventually set free. There are slightly less than 6,000 people now being held, including approximately 1,600 serving sentences.   With renewed urgency in fighting terrorism, Saudi authorities built a whole new series of special security prisons—and they are reportedly full today. There have been regular, large batches of arrests of al-Qaeda-affiliated figures in the last several years.   There are of course still Saudis involved in terrorism—they just are not in the country. Saudis made up the largest group operating in al-Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan before 9/11 and some are still active abroad. A significant number of Saudi nationals are believed to be in Yemen operating with AQAP.

#### 4. Blame-dodging- plan creates political incentives that deter strikes in the first place

Oliphant, 13 -- National Journal deputy magazine editor

[James, “Vetting the Kill List,” 5-30-13, http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/vetting-the-kill-list-20130404, accessed 8-16-13, mss]

Given that reality, **shifting** the **responsibility** of a sign-off to a set of federal judges, who are unelected and serve for life, would allow the White House to escape the consequences of its actions, or more crucially, perhaps its failure to act if a target slips out of harm’s way and then masterminds an attack. Military decisions are, at heart, political ones, McNeal says, and they are rightly made by the branch of government whose top official, the president, faces voters. (A case in point: Republicans suffered at the ballot box in 2006 and 2008 as a result of the public’s displeasure with the Iraq war.) “If you’re a politician,” McNeal says of a drone court, “this is great. Because you aren’t on the hook for anything.” By and large, federal judges don’t want to be in this position. They worry about damaging the integrity of the bench. Retired Judge James Robertson, who served on the U.S. Appeals Court in Washington, argued in The Washington Post that the Constitution forbids the judiciary from issuing advisory opinions. “Federal courts rule on specific disputes between adversary parties,” he wrote. “They do not make or approve policy; that job is reserved to Congress and the executive.” The FISA court is a different animal, because approving surveillance is related to Fourth Amendment protections on search warrants. Still, Americans don’t have to grant the White House complete latitude to operate its targeted-killing program. Another idea that has marshaled some support is an inspector general empowered to review operations after the fact. If administration officials know that someone else ultimately will be auditing their decisions, Chesney says, that may be enough of a check on their conduct. Or as Ronald Reagan once put it: “Trust, but verify.”

### AT: Relations Resilient

#### Relations are key to counterterror- cooperation isn’t guaranteed – means if we win a risk that Saudi disagrees with our counter terror policies the link turns the case

Byman 11—Prof in the Security Studies Program at the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown. Research Director at the Saban Center for M.E. Policy at Brookings (Daniel, What's Next for Yemen?, 22 March 2011, <http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2011/0322_yemen_byman.aspx>)

**Saudi Arabia may destabilize things even further. Riyadh views Yemen as the kingdom's backyard and worries that instability there could spread north**. Saudi Arabia has often tried, and often failed, to play kingmaker in Yemen. Should a new ruler in Sanaa try to hew an independent line from Riyadh, as Saleh did, the Saudis may give financial and other support to his enemies. **For the United States, the biggest worry is terrorism**. Osama Bin Laden could take advantage of additional instability to channel more resources to Yemen. No matter what, AQAP will take advantage of any easing of pressure to plan more attacks and build their organization. A new government, like Saleh's, would probably see AQAP as a relatively minor threat and would focus its intelligence services and political energies on its domestic enemies and rivals, leaving counterterrorism a distant second. **There is only so much cooperation the United States can buy. U.S. influence in Yemen is quite limited. The United States can try**, like Saudi Arabia does, **to support its favored local factions against their rivals. This may put Washington crossways with Riyadh if we have different favorites**. An even bigger problem is that **the United States lacks the intelligence for such deft dancing and would likely be manipulated by local players**.

## 2NC Solvency

#### Courts can’t shape drone policy- even judges agree

**Lohmann 1-28**-13 [Julia, director of the Harvard Law National Security Research Committee, BA in political science from the University of California, Berkeley, “Distinguishing CIA-Led from Military-Led Targeted Killings,” <http://www.lawfareblog.com/wiki/the-lawfare-wiki-document-library/targeted-killing/effects-of-particular-tactic-on-issues-related-to-targeted-killings/>]

Moreover, the judiciary’s oversight over CIA covert actions—as well as judicial review of the Executive’s compliance with CAS—is also quite limited. In particular, strict standing requirements, the political question doctrine, the state secrets privilege, and courts’ invocation of “equitable discretion” are likely impediments to the success of any challenge to a CIA covert action in U.S. courts.¶ Consider, for instance, the case of Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (2010). At issue in that case was the U.S. government’s then-alleged placement of Anwar Al-Aulaqi, a dual U.S.-Yemeni citizen hiding in Yemen and with purported ties to al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, on one of its targeted killing lists. Al-Aulaqi’s father challenged that action, seeking to enjoin the U.S. government from targeting his son. The district court, however, dismissed his case, finding that he had no standing to sue and that, in any event, the case was non-justiciable under the political question doctrine. In particular, the court felt that “[j]udicial resolution of the ‘particular questions’ posed” would require [it] to decide complex issues such as “whether … Anwar Al–Aulaqi’s alleged terrorist activity render[ed] him a concrete, specific, and imminent threat to life or physical safety” and “whether there are means short of lethal force that the United States could reasonably employ to address any threat that Anwar Al–Aulaqi poses to U.S. national security interests.” These questions, the court said, would require the court take into account military, strategic, and diplomatic considerations – e.g. to “assess the merits of the President’s (alleged) decision to launch an attack on a foreign target” – that it was simply not competent to handle.

## 2NC Leadership

### 2NC- Can’t solve cred

**Wike ’12**

#### Obama mishandles leadership- he won’t instill the values and he hasn’t empirically

**Lagon ’11**

### 2NC—Don’t Solve Shit

No time-frame – takes decades to repair legitimacy

Freeman 6 (Chas W., Ambassador (USFS, Ret.), “Why Not Let Them Hate Us, as Long as They Fear Us?”, 11-4, http://www.publicdiplomacy.org/71.htm)

To rediscover public diplomacy and to practice it successfully, in other words, we must repudiate Caligula’s maxim and replace it with our traditional respect for the opinion of mankind. I do not think it is beyond us to do so. We are a far better and more courageous people than we currently appear. But when we do restore ourselves to mental balance, we will, I fear, find that decades are required – it will take decades – to rebuild the appeal and influence our post-9/11 psychoses took a mere five years to destroy. In the process of reaffirming our traditions, as I am confident we shall, Americans may well find a renewed role for an independent agency that can facilitate the projection of our democracy and its values abroad.

## 2NC Prolif

### 2NC Prolif Inev

#### Social science proves no modeling- US signals are dismissed

Zenko ‘13 [Micah, Council on Foreign Relations Center for Preventive Action Douglas Dillon fellow, "The Signal and the Noise," Foreign Policy, 2-2-13, www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/02/20/the\_signal\_and\_the\_noise, accessed 6-12-13, mss]

Later, Gen. Austin observed of cutting forces from the Middle East: "Once you reduce the presence in the region, you could very well signal the wrong things to our adversaries." Sen. Kelly Ayotte echoed his observation, claiming that President Obama's plan to withdraw 34,000 thousand U.S. troops from Afghanistan within one year "leaves us dangerously low on military personnel...it's going to send a clear signal that America's commitment to Afghanistan is going wobbly." Similarly, during a separate House Armed Services Committee hearing, Deputy Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter ominously warned of the possibility of sequestration: "Perhaps most important, the world is watching. Our friends and allies are watching, potential foes -- all over the world." These routine and unchallenged assertions highlight what is perhaps the most widely agreed-upon conventional wisdom in U.S. foreign and national security policymaking: the inherent power of signaling. This psychological capability rests on two core assumptions: All relevant international audiences can or will accurately interpret the signals conveyed, and upon correctly comprehending this signal, these audiences will act as intended by U.S. policymakers. Many policymakers and pundits fundamentally believe that the Pentagon is an omni-directional radar that uniformly transmits signals via presidential declarations, defense spending levels, visits with defense ministers, or troop deployments to receptive antennas. A bit of digging, however, exposes cracks in the premises underlying signaling theories. There is a half-century of social science research demonstrating the cultural and cognitive biases that make communication difficult between two humans. Why would this be any different between two states, or between a state and non-state actor? Unlike foreign policy signaling in the context of disputes or escalating crises -- of which there is an extensive body of research into types and effectiveness -- policymakers' claims about signaling are merely made in a peacetime vacuum. These signals are never articulated with a precision that could be tested or falsified, and thus policymakers cannot be judged misleading or wrong. Paired with the faith in signaling is the assumption that policymakers can read the minds of potential or actual friends and adversaries. During the cycle of congressional hearings this spring, you can rest assured that elected representatives and expert witnesses will claim to know what the Iranian supreme leader thinks, how "the Taliban" perceives White House pronouncements about Afghanistan, or how allies in East Asia will react to sequestration. This self-assuredness is referred to as the illusion of transparency by psychologists, or how "people overestimate others' ability to know them, and...also overestimate their ability to know others." Policymakers also conceive of signaling as a one-way transmission: something that the United States does and others absorb. You rarely read or hear critical thinking from U.S. policymakers about how to interpret the signals from others states. Moreover, since U.S. officials correctly downplay the attention-seeking actions of adversaries -- such as Iran's near-weekly pronouncement of inventing a new drone or missile -- wouldn't it be safer to assume that the majority of U.S. signals are similarly dismissed? During my encounters with foreign officials, few take U.S. government pronouncements seriously, and instead assume they are made to appease domestic audiences.

### 2NC No Chinese Drone Aggression

#### China won’t use drones aggressively- rationality checks

**Erickson and Strange 5-29**-13 [Andrew Erickson is an associate professor at the Naval War College and an Associate in Research at Harvard University's Fairbank Centre, Austin Strange is a researcher at the Naval War College's China Maritime Studies Institute, “China has drones. Now how will it use them?” <http://www.nationmultimedia.com/opinion/China-has-drones-Now-how-will-it-use-them-30207095.html>]

Drones, able to dispatch death remotely, without human eyes on their targets or a pilot's life at stake, make people uncomfortable - even when they belong to democratic governments that presumably have some limits on using them for ill. (On May 23, in a major speech, US President Barack Obama laid out what some of those limits are.) An even more alarming prospect is that unmanned aircraft will be acquired and deployed by authoritarian regimes, with fewer checks on their use of lethal force.¶ Those worried about exactly that tend to point their fingers at China. In March, after details emerged that China had considered taking out a drug trafficker in Myanmar with a drone strike, a CNN blog post warned, "Today, it's Myanmar. Tomorrow, it could very well be some other place in Asia or beyond." Around the same time, a National Journal article entitled "When the Whole World Has Drones" teased out some of the consequences of Beijing's drone programme, asking, "What happens if China arms one of its remote-piloted planes and strikes Philippine or Indian trawlers in the South China Sea?"¶ Indeed, the time to fret about when China and other authoritarian countries will acquire drones is over: they have them. The question now is when and how they will use them. But as with its other, less exotic military capabilities, Beijing has cleared only a technological hurdle - and its behaviour will continue to be constrained by politics.¶ China has been developing a drone capacity for over half a century, starting with its reverse engineering of Soviet Lavochkin La-17C target drones that it had received from Moscow in the late 1950s. Today, Beijing's opacity makes it difficult to gauge the exact scale of the programme, but according to Ian Easton, an analyst at the Project 2049 Institute, an American think-tank devoted to Asia-Pacific security matters, by 2011 China's air force alone had over 280 combat drones. In other words, its fleet of unmanned aerial vehicles is already bigger and more sophisticated than all but the United States'; in this relatively new field Beijing is less of a newcomer and more of a fast follower. And the force will only become more effective: the Lijian ("sharp sword" in Chinese), a combat drone in the final stages of development, will make China one of the very few states that have or are building a stealth drone capacity.¶ This impressive arsenal may tempt China to pull the trigger. The fact that a Chinese official acknowledged that Beijing had considered using drones to eliminate the Myanmar drug trafficker, Naw Kham, makes clear that it would not be out of the question for China to launch a drone strike in a security operation against a non-state actor. Meanwhile, as China's territorial disputes with its neighbours have escalated, there is a chance that Beijing would introduce unmanned aircraft, especially since India, the Philippines and Vietnam distantly trail China in drone funding and capacity, and would find it difficult to compete. Beijing is already using drones to photograph the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands it disputes with Japan, as the retired Chinese major-general Peng Guangqian revealed earlier this year, and to keep an eye on movements near the North Korean border.¶ Beijing, however, is unlikely to use its drones lightly. It already faces tremendous criticism from much of the international community for its perceived brazenness in continental and maritime sovereignty disputes. With its leaders attempting to allay notions that China's rise poses a threat to the region, injecting drones conspicuously into these disputes would prove counterproductive. China also fears setting a precedent for the use of drones in East Asian hotspots that the United States could eventually exploit. For now, Beijing is showing that it understands these risks, and to date it has limited its use of drones in these areas to surveillance, according to recent public statements from China's Defence Ministry.¶ What about using drones outside of Chinese-claimed areas? That China did not, in fact, launch a drone strike on the Myanmar drug criminal underscores its caution. According to Liu Yuejin, the director of the anti-drug bureau in China's Ministry of Public Security, Beijing considered using a drone carrying a 20-kilogram TNT payload to bomb Kham's mountain redoubt in northeast Myanmar. Kham had already evaded capture three times, so a drone strike may have seemed to be the best option. The authorities apparently had at least two plans for capturing Kham. The method they ultimately chose was to send Chinese police forces to lead a transnational investigation that ended in April 2012 with Kham's capture near the Myanmar-Laos border. The ultimate decision to refrain from the strike may reflect both a fear of political reproach and a lack of confidence in untested drones, systems, and operators.¶ The restrictive position that Beijing takes on sovereignty in international forums will further constrain its use of drones. China is not likely to publicly deploy drones for precision strikes or in other military assignments without first having been granted a credible mandate to do so. The gold standard of such an authorisation is a resolution passed by the UN Security Council, the stamp of approval that has permitted Chinese humanitarian interventions in Africa and anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. China might consider using drones abroad with some sort of regional authorisation, such as a country giving Beijing explicit permission to launch a drone strike within its territory. But even with the endorsement of the international community or specific states, China would have to weigh any benefits of a drone strike abroad against the potential for mishaps and perceptions that it was infringing on other countries' sovereignty - something Beijing regularly decries when others do it. The limitations on China's drone use are reflected in the country's academic literature on the topic. The bulk of Chinese drone research is dedicated to scientific and technological topics related to design and performance. The articles that do discuss potential applications primarily point to major combat scenarios -such as a conflagration with Taiwan or the need to attack a US aircraft carrier - which would presumably involve far more than just drones. Chinese researchers have thought a great deal about the utility of drones for domestic surveillance and law enforcement, as well as for non-combat-related tasks near China's contentious borders. Few scholars, however, have publicly considered the use of drone strikes overseas.¶ Yet there is a reason why the United States has employed drones extensively despite domestic and international criticism: it is much easier and cheaper to kill terrorists from above than to try to root them out through long and expensive counterinsurgency campaigns. Some similar challenges loom on China's horizon. Within China, Beijing often considers protests and violence in the restive border regions, such as Xinjiang and Tibet, to constitute terrorism. It would presumably consider ordering precision strikes to suppress any future violence there. Even if such strikes are operationally prudent, China's leaders understand that they would damage the country's image abroad, but they prioritise internal stability above all else. Domestic surveillance by drones is a different issue; there should be few barriers to its application in what is already one of the world's most heavily policed societies. China might also be willing to use stealth drones in foreign airspace without authorisation if the risk of detection were low enough; it already deploys intelligence-gathering ships in the exclusive economic zones of Japan and the United States, as well as in the Indian Ocean.¶ Still, although China enjoys a rapidly expanding and cutting-edge drone fleet, it is bound by the same rules of the game as the rest of the military's tools. Beyond surveillance, the other non-lethal military actions that China can take with its drones are to facilitate communications within the Chinese military, support electronic warfare by intercepting electronic communications and jamming enemy systems, and help identify targets for Chinese precision strike weapons, such as missiles. Beijing's overarching approach remains one of caution - something Washington must bear in mind with its own drone programme.

## 2NC Terrorism

### 2NC No Terror

#### Their ev concedes there is a greater chance of cooperation rather than conflict after an attack

**Ayson 2010** (Robert, Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington,“After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 33, Issue 7, July, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via InformaWorld)

There is also the question of how other nuclear-armed states respond to the act of nuclear terrorism on another member of that special club. It could reasonably be expected that following a nuclear terrorist attack on the United States, both Russia and China would extend immediate sympathy and support to Washington and would work alongside the United States in the Security Council. But there is just a chance, albeit a slim one, where the support of Russia and/or China is less automatic in some cases than in others. For example, what would happen if the United States wished to discuss its right to retaliate against groups based in their territory? If, for some reason, Washington found the responses of Russia and China deeply underwhelming, (neither “for us or against us”) might it also suspect that they secretly were in cahoots with the group, increasing (again perhaps ever so slightly) the chances of a major exchange. If the terrorist group had some connections to groups in Russia and China, or existed in areas of the world over which Russia and China held sway, and if Washington felt that Moscow or Beijing were placing a curiously modest level of pressure on them, what conclusions might it then draw about their culpability?

#### No WMD terror- recruitment/lethality tradeoff

Shapiro, 13 – Princeton University politics and international affairs professor

[Jacob N., Ph.D. Political Science, Association for Analytic Learning about Islam and Muslim Societies faculty fellow, Center for Economic Research in Pakistan research fellow, Princeton University Empirical Studies of Conflict Project co-director, Council on Foreign Relations member, World Politics associate editor, "The Business Habits of Highly Effective Terrorists," Foreign Affairs, 8-14-13, www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139817/jacob-n-shapiro/the-business-habits-of-highly-effective-terrorists?page=show, accessed 8-18-13, mss]

In addition to being a ruthless jihadist, Ayman al-Zawahiri long ago earned a reputation for being a terrible boss. When he took over al Qaeda in 2011, senior U.S. intelligence officials were already pointing out his penchant for micro-management. (In one instance in the 1990s, he reached out to operatives in Yemen to castigate them for buying a new fax machine when their old one was working just fine.) Reports that last week’s terror alert was triggered when Zawahiri reached out to Nasir al-Wuhayshi, his second-in-command and the leader of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula -- a communication that Washington predictably managed to intercept -- only hardened the impression that he lacks the savvy to run a global terror organization. But few of Zawahiri’s many critics have paused to consider what the task of leading a terror organization actually entails. It is true that Zawahiri’s management style has made his organization vulnerable to foreign intelligence agencies and provoked disgruntlement among the terrorist rank and file, not to mention drawing last week’s drone strikes. But it is equally true that Zawahiri had few other options. Given that terrorists are, by definition, engaged in criminal activity, you would think that they would place a premium on secrecy. But historically, many terrorist groups have been meticulous record keepers. Members of the Red Brigades, an Italian terrorist group active in the 1970s and early 1980s, report having spent more time accounting for their activities than actually training or preparing attacks. From 2005 through at least 2010, senior leaders of al Qaeda in Iraq kept spreadsheets detailing salary payments to hundreds of fighters, among many other forms of written records. And when the former military al Qaeda military commander Mohammed Atef had a dispute with Midhat Mursi al-Sayid Umar, an explosives expert for the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, in the 1990s, one of his complaints was that Umar failed to turn in his receipts for a trip he took with his family. Such bureaucracy makes terrorists vulnerable to their enemies. But terrorists do it anyway. In part, that is because large-scale terror plots and extended terror campaigns require so much coordination that they cannot be carried out without detailed communication among the relevant actors and written records to help leaders track what is going on. Gerry Bradley, a former terrorist with the Provisional Irish Republican Army, for example, describes in his memoir how he required his subordinates in Belfast in 1973 to provide daily reports on their proposed operations so that he could ensure that the activities of subunits did not conflict. Several leaders of the Kenyan Mau Mau insurgency report that, as their movement grew in the early 1950s, they needed to start maintaining written accounting records and fighter registries to monitor their finances and personnel. But the deeper part of the answer is that the managers of terrorist organizations face the same basic challenges as the managers of any large organization. What is true for Walmart is true for al Qaeda: Managers need to keep tabs on what their people are doing and devote resources to motivate their underlings to pursue the organization’s aims. In fact, terrorist managers face a much tougher challenge. Whereas most businesses have the blunt goal of maximizing profits, terrorists’ aims are more precisely calibrated: An attack that is too violent can be just as damaging to the cause as an attack that is not violent enough. Al Qaeda in Iraq learned this lesson in Anbar Province in 2006, when the local population turned against them, partly in response to the group’s violence against civilians who disagreed with it. Terrorist leaders also face a stubborn human resources problem: Their talent pool is inherently unstable. Terrorists are obliged to seek out recruits who are predisposed to violence -- that is to say, young men with a chip on their shoulder. Unsurprisingly, these recruits are not usually disposed to following orders or recognizing authority figures. Terrorist managers can craft meticulous long-term strategies, but those are of little use if the people tasked with carrying them out want to make a name for themselves right now. Terrorist managers are also obliged to place a premium on bureaucratic control, because they lack other channels to discipline the ranks. When Walmart managers want to deal with an unruly employee or a supplier who is defaulting on a contract, they can turn to formal legal procedures. Terrorists have no such option. David Ervine, a deceased Irish Unionist politician and onetime bomb maker for the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), neatly described this dilemma to me in 2006. “We had some very heinous and counterproductive activities being carried out that the leadership didn’t punish because they had to maintain the hearts and minds within the organization,” he said, referring to a period in the late 1980s when he and the other leaders had made a strategic calculation that the Unionist cause was best served by focusing on nonviolent political competition. In Ervine’s (admittedly self-interested) telling, the UVF’s senior leaders would have ceased violence much earlier than the eventual 1994 cease-fire, but they could not do so because the rank and file would have turned on them. For terrorist managers, the only way to combat those “counterproductive activities” is to keep a tight rein on the organization. Recruiting only the most zealous will not do the trick, because, as the alleged chief of the Palestinian group Black September wrote in his memoir, “diehard extremists are either imbeciles or traitors.” So someone in Zawahiri’s position has his hands full: To pull off a major attack, [they need]~~he needs~~ to coordinate among multiple terrorists, track what his operatives are doing regardless of their intentions, and motivate them to follow orders against their own maverick instincts. Fortunately for the rest of us, the things terrorists do to achieve these tasks **sow the seeds of their undoing**. Placing calls, sending e-mails, keeping spreadsheets, and having members request reimbursements all create opportunities for intelligence agencies to learn what terrorists are up to and then disrupt them. In that way, Zawahiri’s failures are not just a reflection of his personal weaknesses but a case study in the inherent limits that all terror groups face. That is good news, of course, for potential terror targets: As long as our intelligence and law enforcement agencies remain vigilant, **there is no way terrorist** organization**s** **will ever rise above the level of** the **tolerable nuisance**, which is what they have been for the last decade. But for aspiring terror managers, it is a dispiriting reminder that **there is no escape from the red tape that** ultimately **dooms their cause**.

[Matt note: gender-modified]

# 2NC OV

#### Try or die- failure to reach a budget deal causes short term economic hiccups that snowball into collapse- risk is exponential, each new day of the shutdown increases the risk

#### Shutdown takes out the leadership advantage

Lieberthal and O'Hanlon 12 (Kenneth G. and Michael E., July 10th 2012 "The Real National Security Threat: America's Debt")

Lastly, American economic weakness undercuts U.S. leadership abroad. Other countries sense our weakness and wonder about our purported decline. If this perception becomes more widespread, and the case that we are in decline becomes more persuasive, countries will begin to take actions that reflect their skepticism about America's future. Allies and friends will doubt our commitment and may pursue nuclear weapons for their own security, for example; adversaries will sense opportunity and be less restrained in throwing around their weight in their own neighborhoods. The crucial Persian Gulf and Western Pacific regions will likely become less stable. Major war will become more likely.¶ When running for president last time, Obama eloquently articulated big foreign policy visions: healing America's breach with the Muslim world, controlling global climate change, dramatically curbing global poverty through development aid, moving toward a world free of nuclear weapons. These were, and remain, worthy if elusive goals. However, for Obama or his successor, there is now a much more urgent big-picture issue: restoring U.S. economic strength. Nothing else is really possible if that fundamental prerequisite to effective foreign policy is not reestablished.

#### It makes terrorist blowback and recruitment inevitable

**Burton, J.D. candidate, Georgetown University Law Center, 2004** (Adam, “NOTE: A Grave and Gathering Threat: Business and Security Implications of the AIDS Epidemic and a Critical Evaluation of the Bush Administration's Response”, 35 Geo. J. Int’l L. 433, lexis)

The consequences for economic development cut even deeper than injury to multinationals already in Africa, however, as economic growth or stagnation for Africa has reverberations on the macro level beyond the continent. At stake is the legitimacy of Western political and economic ideals in the developing world. For the Bush Administration, spreading liberal democracy is in many ways intertwined with the war on terror. [n53](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.liberty.edu:2048/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.772379.6474802146&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1246152653665&returnToKey=20_T6857740029&parent=docview#n53) Countries with an interest in global economic stability are less likely to sponsor terrorism, and individuals with a stake in the capitalist order (i.e., people wealthy enough to own private property) are less likely to join terrorist groups. [n54](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.liberty.edu:2048/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.772379.6474802146&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1246152653665&returnToKey=20_T6857740029&parent=docview#n54) In contrast, a class of desperate and hopeless people in Africa might produce the next flood of converts to radical Islam, which has already penetrated East Africa and has  [\*442]  begun to spread southward at a steady pace. [n55](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.liberty.edu:2048/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.772379.6474802146&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1246152653665&returnToKey=20_T6857740029&parent=docview#n55)

#### Shutdown destroys the offices responsible for managing drone proliferation

Epstein 10/4/13 (Jennifer, Shutdown impedes Iran, Syria sanctions, White House Says")

The Obama administration's efforts to pressure Iran, Syria and others are inhibited by the government shutdown, White House press secretary Jay Carney suggested Friday.¶ The Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control has had to furlough all but 11 of its 175 full-time employees, "meaning that the office is unable to sustain its core functions," Carney said. President Obama will be briefed on the office's shutdown operations later Friday afternoon.¶ That means its work including issuing new sanctions designations against "those enabling the governments of Iran and Syria, as well as terrorist organizations, WMD proliferators, narcotics cartels and transnational organized crime groups" is impeded. The office also investigates sanctions violations and offers penalties, issuing licenses for humanitarian activities, and issuing new sanctions prohibitions. ¶ But he wouldn't directly say whether the shutdown will affect sanctions against Iran and Syria. "I'm saying people who are in place normally under normal circumstances have been furloughed," he said. "That is a negative consequence."¶ "It illustrates the consequences that the Republican shutdown continues to have on the government's missions and workers across the country," Carney said.¶ Wendy Sherman, the under secretary of state for political affairs, made similar statements Thursday about Iran sanctions.¶ “Our ability to do that, to enforce sanctions, to stop sanction evaders, is being hampered significantly by the shutdown," she told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. ¶ Still, the administration is doing its best, she said. “Let me assure you that we will continue to vigorously enforce the sanctions that are in place as we explore a negotiated resolution, and will be especially focused on sanctions evasion and efforts by the Iranians to relieve the pressure."

# at: no pc

#### your ev is about PC with democratic voters and senators- not house republicans- 1nc uniqueness says Obama still has leverage

#### Republican disunity is high now – only the plan creates a rallying point

Reuters 9/26/13 (Thomas Ferraro and Rachelle Younglai, "No clear path to ending US Debt Limit, Spending Impasse")

Republicans face internal challenges in the high-stakes fight over the basic functions of the U.S. government.¶ Some of the party's most conservative members were balking at their leaders' debt limit plan, which was widely seen as an opening move subject to negotiation, saying it does not do enough to rein in government spending.¶ Representative Tim Huelskamp of Kansas, speaking to reporters, said he and at least 17 other Republicans would oppose the measure, leaving the bill short of enough votes for passage, assuming all Democrats voted 'no.'¶ At the same time, some centrist Republicans think it is counter-productive to wage yet another fight against Obamacare, especially on a bill as important as the debt limit.

#### Obama PC high- has leverage for a deal

The Citizen 10/3/13 (Guy Cosentino, Former Mayor of Auburn, "Cosentino: Obama Needs to Show Leadership")

So while most of the concentration this week will be about getting the federal government back in operation, the president, who has been extremely weak in the past crises, should make sure that any agreement to get the government fully operational requires a deal on raising the debt ceiling. Anything less encourages another crisis which will have far worse ramifications in the long term than what is occurring this week, ultimately wrecking the economy.¶ Obama has shown some backbone these last two weeks over the shutdown but is largely not comprising on his Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, better known as “Obamacare.” After watching him “blink” after his sizeable election victory last November on the fiscal cliff issues, one might wonder if his toughness right now is because his name is on the signature legislation under attack. With Congress having a 10 percent approval rating, this is the time for the president to use his bully pulpit and popularity to get a long term deal.¶ Presidential leadership, for the long term, means holding out on a deal to open the federal government back up that resolves the debt ceiling issue. Anything less will set the board for another fiscal crisis, jeopardizing our fiscal credibility worldwide and tenuous, at best, economic recovery.

#### Obama has to invest capital – it’s critical to reaching an agreement

McAuliff and Siddiqui 10/1/13 (Michael and Sabrina, Writers for the Huffington Post, "Government Shutdown: Congress Has No Clue How to End It")

"I haven't gotten any sense today of where they are," Flake said. Asked if he felt the shutdown would be resolved in a big package over the debt ceiling, the Arizona Republican said, "I hope not. I hope we can resolve this by then."¶ Some House leaders, among them Budget Committee Chairman Paul Ryan (R-Wis.), would like to link the whole [funding question to the debt ceiling,](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/10/01/paul-ryan-government-shutdown-debt-ceiling_n_4023983.html) which the country is forecast to reach on Oct. 17.¶ Sen. Susan Collins (R-Maine) told reporters she was "disappointed" Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-Nev.) refused the House GOP's bid to create a conference committee to work out the short-term spending bill that targets Obamacare. She said at this point the matter might only be resolved by force from the White House.¶ "I think the president needs to bring people together on both sides of the aisle in both parties and not let them out of the room until there's an agreement," Collins said.

# uniqueness

#### Shutdown will be short-lived now –

Noble and Davies 10/1/13 (Josh and Paul, Financil Times, Hong Kong, "US Shutdown Reaction: "Odds Favour A Short Event")

¶ The heat will build on politicians from constituents who were furloughed, inconvenienced, or fearful of market consequences. That is why we believe the odds favour a short event – over in one week.¶ **Harm Bandholz, chief US economist, UniCredit:**¶ I think it is only a matter of days, maybe hours, until the majority of Republicans will eventually free themselves from the pressure of the Tea Party minority and vote along with Congressional Democrats to reopen the government. But don’t forget, the government shutdown is merely the prelude to a much bigger issue, namely the forthcoming debt limit fight.

#### The republicans have the votes to get it done

Cillizza 10/3/13 (Chris, Washington Post, "The Government Shutdown Could End Today. All it would cost is John Boehern's Speakership")

[There are currently 19 House Republicans on the record in support of a “clean” continuing resolution](http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2013/10/02/the-fixs-clean-cr-whip-count/), meaning one without any other extraneous measures — like the defunding or delaying of Obamcare — attached. Combine those nineteen with the 200 Democrats who would almost certainly vote as a bloc in support of such a clean CR and you get 219 votes — a majority of the House. The bill has already been passed by the Democratic-controlled Senate, so it would go to straight to President Obama who would sign it. Shutdown over. Easy.

#### Meeting Proves -

The New York Times 10/2/13 (Jackie Calmes and Jonathan Weisman, "Obama Sets Conditions for Talks: Pass Funding and Raise Debt Ceiling")

In a meeting with Wall Street executives to enlist their help, and then in [an interview with CNBC](http://www.nytimes.com/video/2013/10/02/us/100000002479228/obama-on-the-government-shutdown.html) before his White House meeting with Congressional leaders, Mr. Obama said he needed to draw a firm line “to break that fever” in the House among hard-line conservatives who repeatedly issued fiscal ultimatums, resulting in government by crisis.¶ “As soon as we get a clean piece of legislation that reopens the government — and there is a majority for that right now in the House of Representatives — until we get that done, until we make sure that Congress allows Treasury to pay for things that Congress itself already authorized, we are not going to engage in a series of negotiations,” Mr. Obama told CNBC, a cable business-news channel.¶ Mr. Boehner, under pressure from Republican conservatives and outside Tea Party groups, has declined to bring a so-called clean continuing resolution to the House for a vote because it would pass mostly with Democrats’ votes and probably prompt a conservative backlash that could cost him his leadership office.¶ Mr. Obama, in the interview, said he must resist the Republican demands this time because a precedent is at stake. “If we get in the habit where a few folks, an extremist wing of one party, whether it’s Democrat or Republican, are allowed to extort concessions based on a threat of undermining the full faith and credit of the United States, then any president who comes after me — not just me — will find themselves unable to govern effectively,” he said.¶ Many Republicans concede that Mr. Obama has the political advantage in the current confrontation, so some in the House reacted hopefully to the president’s summons to Congressional leaders to meet late in the day. Representative Michael G. Grimm, Republican of New York, called the White House meeting “the beginning of the end of the government shutdown,” although others in Congress and the administration were less optimistic.

# link wall

#### Huge republican opposition to the plan- FISA proves the link, doesn’t dispute it

Carlo 2/13/13(Munoz, The Hill, "No Court For Drone Oversight, Says GOP")

But the creation of a FISA-like court for drone strikes has been met with fierce resistance from Republicans who say protecting the nation must always come first. ¶ “We don’t allow [the judicial branch] to control the commander in chief’s decision to send people into battle,” Graham said. “Courts are not trained for this. They are not in the targeting business. Who the enemy is composed of and who represents a threat is a military decision, not a criminal decision.”¶ Asked whether he would support McCain’s notion of fully transitioning the program to the Pentagon, Graham replied: “That might make a lot of sense [and] I might be open to that.”

#### Plan reignites turf battles

Munoz, 13 -- The Hill staff writer, covering Defense and National Security

[Carlo, "Turf battle builds quietly in Congress over control of armed drone program," The Hill, 4-9-13, thehill.com/homenews/administration/292501-turf-battle-builds-quietly-over-control-of-armed-drone-program-, accessed 5-23-13, mss]

The fight is a typical battle over who on Capitol Hill will retain power over the program, according to several analysts, who described it as predictable. ¶ “There is always going to be a turf battle” when dealing with congressional oversight, said Lawrence Korb, a former DOD official and defense analyst at the liberal-leaning Center for American Progress. ¶ But that battle could become particularly heated, given the high-profile nature of the drone program, which since the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks has become a huge factor in shaping counterterrorism policy, given its success, Korb said. ¶ For congressional panels, the fight over who will control the drone program will have a say in the relevancy of the two committees. ¶

#### It’s perceived as a slap in the face to republican leaders

Rayfield 2/11/13 (Jillian, Assistant News Editor for Salon, Focusing on Politics, Salon Online, "Congress Takes Sides on Drones")

Unconditional Defenders: House Intelligence Committee Chairman Mike Rogers, R-Mich., called the use of drones “a lawful act of national self-defense” in an initial statement last week, and argued on Sunday that the program already has enough oversight. “Monthly I have my committee go to the CIA to review them. I as chairman review every single airstrike we use in the war on terror, both on the civilian and the military side when it comes to terrorist strikes,” he said. “There’s plenty of oversight here.”¶ During a [press conference](http://livewire.talkingpointsmemo.com/entry/boehner-onboard-with-revealed-obama-drone-memo) on Feb. 6, House Speaker John Boehner agreed with Rogers’ initial statement that the use of drones is legal and necessary. “That’s all,” Boehner said.¶ “The process of being targeted I think is legal, quite frankly laborious and should reside in the commander in chief to determine who an enemy combatant is and what kind of force to use,” said Sen. Lindsey Graham, R-S.C., who [went so far](http://www.politico.com/blogs/on-congress/2013/02/graham-defends-obama-on-drones-156263.html) as to call the drone program one of the “highlights” of Obama’s presidency so far.¶ “If you take up arms against America and you fight in a terrorist training camp or on the front lines in Pakistan or Afghanistan or Yemen, you shouldn’t be surprised if America reaches out and exacts justice against you,” said Rep. Tom Cotton, R-Ark.¶ Rep. Peter King, R-N.Y., dismissed the “liberal hand-wringing” over the program. “I fully support targeted operations that have been carried out,” he said in a recent [appearance](http://www.mediaite.com/tv/gop-rep-peter-king-dismisses-concerns-about-drone-warfare-so-much-liberal-hand-wringing/) on MSNBC. “I think the president has done the right thing.”¶ Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz., said an oversight panel would be “an encroachment on the powers of the president of the United States.” He added that he does take issue with the program being in “the hands of the Central Intelligence Agency,” when it should reside within the Department of Defense. “Since when is the intelligence agency supposed to be an air force of drones that goes around killing people? I believe that it’s a job for the Department of Defense.”

# at: ww

**PC is finite**

**Page 1-15**-13. [Susan, Washington Bureau Chief, "How Obama can avoid the second-term curse" USA Today -- www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2013/01/14/obama-second-term-curse/1834765/]

2. **Pick a priority**¶ **The president can do something in his second term**, the veterans say, **but not everything**. **Fighting too many battles could mean winning none.**¶ Obama has said his major goals for his second term include enacting a comprehensive immigration bill and energy legislation, and he has added gun control to the list since the December shooting rampage at a Newtown, Conn., elementary school that left 26 children and educators dead. In the next few months, he also faces the need to raise the debt ceiling and deal with automatic spending cuts that are poised to take effect.¶ Some veterans say his list is unrealistically long. "It's still not clear to me what they really want to do," Perino says.¶ **The hard line Obama has drawn with Republicans** on the debt ceiling **risks sapping his political capital and leaving scars that will make prevailing on the other issues more difficult**, Fagen says. "**If he spends this year fighting with Republicans** on the debt ceiling and the fiscal cliff, yeah, (House Speaker) John **Boehner may lose the hand on that**," she says, **but Obama "is the one who is going to be harmed the most long-term."¶** After carrying 49 states in his re-election, Reagan focused on overhauling the tax code, and succeeded. Bush also picked a clear second-term priority — adding private investment accounts to Social Security — only to see it crash in Congress. His next proposal, to overhaul immigration, also failed.¶ **Bush told reporters** after his re-election that **he had "earned** capital in the campaign, **political capital, and now I intend to spend it."** To his dismay, **he** **apparently hadn't earned enough capital to push through such divisive proposals.¶** **Obama made a similar point** at his news conference Monday when asked about a pending showdown with Republicans over raising the debt ceiling. "They've got a particular view of what government should do and should be," he said. "And, you know, that view was rejected by the American people when it was debated during the presidential campaign."¶ **Obama needs to be realistic about not "misinterpreting the size of his victory**," Fagen says. "**That is a recipe for having a very long and cantankerous legislative session with little accomplished**."

\*\*\* GW Bush’s press secretary Dana Perino, Sara Taylor Fagen, political adviser in Bush's second term

**Winners win is not true for Obama – it must be a large, domestic, and economic victory.**

**Kuttner ‘11**

Robert Kuttner, co-founder and co-editor of The American Prospect, as well as a distinguished senior fellow of the think tank Demos. “Barack Obama’s Theory of Power”. The American Prospect. May 16, 2011. <http://prospect.org/cs/articles?article=barack_obamas_theory_of_power>

Obama won more legislative trophies during his first two years than Clinton did, but in many respects, they were poisoned chalices. Health reform proved broadly unpopular because of political missteps—a net negative for Democrats in the 2010 midterm. The stimulus, though valuable, was too small to be a major political plus. Obama hailed it as a great victory rather than pledging to come back for more until recovery was assured. He prematurely abandoned the fight for jobs as his administration’s central theme, though the recession still wracked the nation. And because of the administration’s alliance with Wall Street, Obama suffered both the appearance and reality of being too close to the bankers, despite a partial success on financial reform. Obama’s mortgage-rescue program was the worst of both worlds—it failed to deliver enough relief to make an economic difference yet still signaled politically disabling sympathy for both “deadbeat” homeowners and for bankers. (See this month’s special report on page A1.)

# at: econ d

#### Disregard any ev about the past recession- this situation is different

Axelson 8/27/13 (Ben, The Associated Presss, "Debt Ceiling: Obama 'Won't Negotiate' As Deadline Looms")

This is not the first time Congress has come face to face with the debt ceiling, but an article on [Bloomberg Businessweek](http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-08-27/five-reasons-the-debt-ceiling-fight-is-scarier-this-time) suggests a few complications which make the situation different, and perhaps more dire, than past national debt debates.¶ They note that the business community has not spoken out as forcefully this time because of the "quiet conclusion of the last two debt ceiling battles." That air of complacency may take away a degree of pressure needed to help the parties come to a consensus.¶ In addition, the article says the combination of a budget deficit that is shrinking faster than expected and a weak economy has convinced Democrats that budget cutting isn't necessary. Meanwhile Republicans think cutting the deficit will restore economic confidence, meaning the debate has driven the parties farther apart.¶ [TIME](http://business.time.com/2013/08/26/treasury-secretary-to-congress-u-s-to-hit-debt-ceiling-in-october/) reported that the practice of capping federal borrowing power comes from a time when Congress individually approved each new issuance of debt. As financing grew in complexity during the 1930s, the government moved towards an "aggregate limit" on debt which granted the Treasury more freedom in terms of debt issuance, as long as it remained below the debt ceiling.

#### Our scenarios are statistically correct- default to diversionary conflict theory

Royal 10 – Jedediah Royal, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense, 2010, “Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises,” in Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-215

Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of extern conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defense behavior of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modelski and Thompson’s (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crisis could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin, 1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of **miscalculation** (Fearon, 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner, 1999). Seperately, Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland’s (1996, 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that ‘future expectation of trade’ is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behavious of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations, However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. **Crisis could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations** either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states. Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write, The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favor. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflict self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg & Hess, 2002. P. 89) Economic decline has been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg, Hess, & Weerapana, 2004), which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. ‘Diversionary theory’ suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increase incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a ‘rally around the flag’ effect. Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995), and Blomberg, Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in the use of force. In summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlated economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflict at systemic, dyadic and national levels. This implied connection between integration, crisis and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention.